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SCENARIO 1 — Bob deposits 100 USDT (banded par ⇒ credited 100). USDT → $0.94.
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state: claims 100 USD · reserve 100 USDT (market value $94.00)

A fixed-units      : burn 100 → release 100.00 USDT = $94.00 to Bob
                     reservoir after: 0 units / 0 claims — SOLVENT, never shrank
                     Bob bears his coin's own market move (he chose the USDT rail)
B value-compensated: burn 100 → owes 106.38 USDT ($100.00) but holds only 100
                     SHORT 6.38 USDT — the reservoir SHRINKS; with more
                     holders the shortfall lands on whoever exits LAST (a run)
C writedown+pro-rata: cell written 100 → 94.00; ratio 0.94
                     burn 100 → $94.00 of value on ANY rail (= 100.00 USDT)
                     identical outcome to A here — one holder, one cell

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SCENARIO 2 — mixed basket: Bob 100 USDT + Carol 100 USDC. USDT → $0.94, USDC $1.00.
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state: claims 200 · reserve 100 USDT + 100 USDC (value $194.00)

A fixed-units, everyone exits via the rail they prefer:
   exit on USDT rail: 1 claim → 1 USDT ($0.94) — a DISCOUNT exit, self-selected
   exit on USDC rail: 1 claim → 1 USDC ($1.00) — everyone prefers this…
   → first 100 claims drain the USDC cell at par; the LAST 100 claims can only
     exit via USDT at $0.94. First-mover advantage EXISTS unless the writedown
     lands first — A alone is not run-proof in a mixed basket.

B value-compensated on the USDT rail (1 claim → 1/0.94 units):
   the 100-unit USDT cell retires only 94.00 claims (1.06 units each)
   → 6.00 claims left with NO backing once USDC also drains
   → the reservoir shrank by the compensation; ALSO an arbitrage pump: deposit
     USDC at par → withdraw USDT at value → repeat, drains the USDT cell for free.

C writedown first (cell 100→94, aggregate 194.00, ratio 0.97):
   EVERY claim redeems $0.97 on any rail — Bob and Carol equally,
   order-independent (ADR-0031): no first mover, no rail arbitrage.
   In UNITS: USDT rail pays 1.03 USDT/claim, USDC rail 0.97 USDC/claim
   — same $ value, so nobody queues for one rail. Run defused.

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SCENARIO 3 — the 3% deposit band: par within, market beyond.
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  price $1.00 (normal jitter): 100 deposited → credit 100.00  · basket takes on $0.10 unbacked
  price $0.98 (stress, inside band): 100 deposited → credit 100.00  · basket takes on $2.00 unbacked
  price $0.97 (band edge): 100 deposited → credit 100.00  · basket takes on $3.00 unbacked
  price $0.94 (beyond band): 100 deposited → credit 94.00  · basket takes on $0.00 unbacked
  price $0.87 (SVB-style depeg): 100 deposited → credit 87.00  · basket takes on $0.00 unbacked
  price $1.02 (premium): 100 deposited → credit 100.00  · basket takes on $0.00 unbacked

  the band caps the inflow leak at band% × deposit — bounded like the desk band
  (ADR-0051 §3). Premium side credits PAR, never more (100 units can't back 102).
  The same 3% line is the natural PAUSE + WRITEDOWN trigger: a coin below the band
  is no longer 'jitter' — deposits price at market AND the quorum reviews the cell.

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SCENARIO 4 — timing: Bob exits via the HEALTHY rail before vs after the writedown.
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basket: 100 USDT (@0.94) + 100 USDC · 200 claims

WITHOUT a timely writedown: Bob burns 100 → takes 100 USDC at par ($100).
  remaining: 100 claims backed by 100 USDT = $94.00 → Carol eats ALL $6.00
WITH the writedown first (ratio 0.97): Bob gets $97, Carol keeps $97.
  the 6% loss splits evenly — the timely writedown is what makes rail choice fair.

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VERDICT
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  DEPOSIT  : par within the band (UX: 1=1), market beyond, par-cap on premium.
             Leak bounded at band× deposit; the band line doubles as the review trigger.
  WITHDRAW : POLICY B (value-compensated) is REJECTED — it is the only policy that
             shrinks the reservoir, it creates a last-holder bag and a USDC→USDT
             drain arbitrage. Keep releases FIXED 1:1 IN UNITS per rail (A)…
  …PLUS    : the writedown+pro-rata machinery (C) MUST fire when the band breaks —
             A alone leaves first-mover advantage on the healthy rails; A+C together
             make every exit worth the same $ on every rail. Reservoir never shrinks.
