518a3ce174
Brings the whole project into git (previously only the on-ramp feature and a few parallel files were tracked). Includes: wallet core (src/), CashScript contracts/, the Capacitor shell (shells/), scripts/, tests, and the docs corpus (wiki/, snapshots/, Parameters/, Archive/, KnowledgeBase text). Excluded via .gitignore: node_modules/, dist/, .env (secrets), testnet WIF key files (.chipnet-*.json, devWallets.ts), KnowledgeBase/RAW media (~9.6 GB), transcripts/ (session logs), and machine-local config (.claude/*.local, *.lock). Secret-scanned before commit — no credentials in the tree. Note: src/swapMath.ts, src/swapBuilder.ts, contracts/OpenMintToken.cash are legacy (OP_RETURN era) but still imported; committed as-is, flagged for a separate removal once de-referenced. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
69 lines
3 KiB
Text
69 lines
3 KiB
Text
pragma cashscript ^0.12.0;
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// DeviantEscFeeBlockHeightV2 — EXPERIMENTAL FEASIBILITY TEST (not production).
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//
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// Workaround for trigger 3 after DeviantEscFeeBlockHeight.cash failed to
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// compile (tx.time is not a readable integer — only a require() operand).
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//
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// Approach: the claimer PASSES the block height as an argument
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// (`claimedHeight`), and the contract binds it to consensus with
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// require(tx.time >= claimedHeight);
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// which lowers to OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY: the tx's nLocktime must be
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// >= claimedHeight, and CLTV guarantees nLocktime <= the real current
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// height. So claimedHeight <= currentHeight. The fee is then computed
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// from claimedHeight arithmetically (which IS allowed — it's a normal int).
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//
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// !!! SECURITY HOLE (the headline finding for trigger 3) !!!
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// require(tx.time >= claimedHeight) only puts a LOWER bound on the height.
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// Script has NO opcode to read the *actual* current height as a value, so
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// it cannot force claimedHeight up to "now". A rational claimer therefore
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// always passes the SMALLEST height that still validates (>= genesisHeight),
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// paying the base fee forever. Block-height fee escalation is thus NOT
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// adversarially enforceable on BCH — it degrades to "honest claimers pay
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// more, cheaters pay base." Documented, not production-viable.
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contract DeviantEscFeeBlockHeightV2(
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bytes tokenCategory,
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int backingRateSats,
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int baseFeeBps,
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int feeStepBps,
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int maxFeeBps,
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int genesisHeight,
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int blocksPerStep,
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bytes founderLockingBytecode
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) {
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function claim(int tokenAmount, bytes recipientLockingBytecode, int claimedHeight) {
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require(tokenAmount > 0);
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// Bind the claimed height to consensus (lower bound only — see hole above).
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require(tx.time >= claimedHeight);
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require(claimedHeight >= genesisHeight);
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int currentReservoir = tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].tokenAmount;
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int grossSats = tokenAmount * backingRateSats;
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int elapsed = claimedHeight - genesisHeight;
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int feeBps = baseFeeBps + (elapsed / blocksPerStep) * feeStepBps;
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if (feeBps > maxFeeBps) {
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feeBps = maxFeeBps;
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}
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int feeSats = grossSats * feeBps / 10000;
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require(tx.outputs[0].lockingBytecode == tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].lockingBytecode);
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require(tx.outputs[0].tokenCategory == tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].tokenCategory);
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require(tx.outputs[0].tokenAmount == currentReservoir - tokenAmount);
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require(tx.outputs[0].value >= 546);
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require(tx.outputs[1].lockingBytecode == recipientLockingBytecode);
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require(tx.outputs[1].tokenCategory == tokenCategory);
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require(tx.outputs[1].tokenAmount == tokenAmount);
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require(tx.outputs[1].value == grossSats);
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if (feeSats > 0) {
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require(feeSats >= 546);
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require(tx.outputs[2].lockingBytecode == founderLockingBytecode);
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require(tx.outputs[2].value == feeSats);
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require(tx.outputs[2].tokenCategory == 0x);
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}
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}
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}
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