WizardConnect/docs/protocol.md

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# Protocol
The application-level protocol has two layers:
- **Base protocol** — the handshake messages (`dapp_ready`, `wallet_ready`, `disconnect`) that are
shared across all application protocols and live in `@wizardconnect/core/protocols/base.ts`.
- **hdwalletv1** — the BCH HD-wallet protocol, carrying session data (xpubs) and
sign request round-trips. Defined in `@wizardconnect/core/protocols/hdwalletv1.ts`.
Both layers use the same encrypted relay channel (see [transport.md](transport.md)).
Protocol selection happens during the handshake via `supported_protocols` lists, not via a
hard-coded field. This allows forward-compatible negotiation when future protocol versions are added.
## Message envelope
Every message shares a base shape:
```typescript
interface ProtocolMessage {
action: string; // one of the RelayMsgAction values below
time: number; // Unix timestamp (seconds). Used for replay filtering.
}
```
The `time` field is checked by the relay client: messages older than the last-processed timestamp
are silently dropped. This prevents stale messages buffered at the relay from being re-delivered
after a reconnect.
## Actions
```
dapp_ready — dapp → wallet, signals dapp is alive + lists supported protocols
wallet_ready — wallet → dapp, signals wallet is alive + delivers session data + key exchange
sign_transaction_request — dapp → wallet, asks wallet to sign a transaction
sign_transaction_response — wallet → dapp, returns signed tx or error
sign_cancel — dapp → wallet only, cancels an in-flight sign_transaction_request
disconnect — either → either, courtesy notification before tearing down
chunk — either → either, transport-level. Carries one slice of a larger message
that exceeds NIP-44's 65,535-byte plaintext ceiling. Not tied to
hdwalletv1 semantics. See transport.md.
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```
The action names above are the well-known set. Extensions may define additional action strings
(e.g. `decrypt_request`, `decrypt_response`). Both sides should ignore unknown actions gracefully.
See [extensions.md](extensions.md) for conventions on defining extension messages.
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---
## Base protocol
### dapp_ready
```typescript
interface DappReadyMessage {
action: "dapp_ready";
supported_protocols: string[]; // protocols this dapp supports, in preference order
selected_protocol?: string; // set only on the reactive dapp_ready (after seeing wallet_ready)
wallet_discovered: boolean; // true if dapp already saw this wallet this session
dapp_name?: string; // optional, sent on first message for wallet UI
dapp_icon?: string; // optional icon URL or data-URI
time: number;
}
```
`dapp_name` and `dapp_icon` are captured by the wallet on the first `dapp_ready` that includes
them. The wallet shows these in its connections list.
`selected_protocol` is absent on the proactive `dapp_ready` (sent before the dapp has seen
the wallet). Once the dapp receives `wallet_ready` and picks a protocol, the reactive `dapp_ready`
carries `selected_protocol` so the wallet can confirm the agreed protocol.
### wallet_ready
```typescript
interface WalletReadyMessage {
action: "wallet_ready";
supported_protocols: string[]; // protocols this wallet supports
wallet_name: string;
wallet_icon: string;
dapp_discovered: boolean; // true if wallet already saw this dapp this session
session: Record<string, unknown>; // keyed by protocol name; each value is protocol-specific
public_key: string; // wallet's Nostr x-only pubkey (hex, 32 bytes) — key exchange
secret: string; // echo of the shared secret from the URI — MITM prevention
time: number;
}
```
`wallet_ready` is the most important message in the protocol. It serves two purposes:
1. **Key exchange**`public_key` is the wallet's Nostr pubkey; `secret` is echoed from the
connection URI for MITM prevention. The dapp verifies the secret and calls
`setPairedPublicKey(public_key)` before processing the rest of the message. This is why
`wallet_ready` bypasses the relay-client peer filter.
2. **Application handshake** — the wallet populates `session` for every protocol it supports.
The dapp picks the first protocol from its own `supported_protocols` list that also appears
in the wallet's list, then reads `session[selectedProtocol]` for the protocol-specific data.
### Protocol negotiation
1. The dapp sends its `supported_protocols` list in the proactive `dapp_ready`.
2. The wallet replies with its own `supported_protocols` and the `session` map.
3. The dapp selects `agreed = dapp.supported_protocols.find(p => wallet.supported_protocols.includes(p))`.
4. If no overlap: the dapp sends `disconnect(reason: "protocol_mismatch")` and emits a `disconnect`
event. No further communication happens.
5. If agreed: the dapp reads `session[agreed]` and sends a reactive `dapp_ready` with
`selected_protocol = agreed`.
### Handshake
The handshake uses a **mutual-discovery** pattern. The goal is for both sides to converge to a
live session regardless of who reconnects first. "Discovered" means "I have received and processed
a ready message from the other side in this runtime session."
#### Rules
1. On every connect/reconnect, each side sends its own "ready" message proactively. The wallet
sends `wallet_ready` immediately (it already knows the dapp's pubkey from the URI). The dapp
sends `dapp_ready` once the relay is connected and key exchange resolves.
2. Each "ready" message carries a boolean indicating whether the sender has already seen the
other party (`wallet_discovered` in `dapp_ready`, `dapp_discovered` in `wallet_ready`).
3. On receiving a "ready" with the discovery flag `false`, the receiver must send back its own
"ready" — *even if it already sent one* — because the other side has lost state and needs
a fresh delivery.
4. The wallet guards against duplicate `wallet_ready` messages within a single connection cycle
via `walletReadySentThisCycle`. Both `walletReadySentThisCycle` and `dappDiscovered` reset to
`false` on each new connect/reconnect. This ensures the wallet always sends
`wallet_ready(dapp_discovered=false)` at the start of a new connection cycle, matching the
"Wallet reconnects" scenario. Receiving `dapp_ready(wallet_discovered=false)` also resets
`walletReadySentThisCycle`.
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#### Scenarios
**Initial connect (neither has seen the other):**
```
Dapp ──dapp_ready(supported=["hdwalletv1"], wallet_discovered=false)──▶ Wallet (proactive)
Dapp ◀──wallet_ready(supported=["hdwalletv1"], session={...}, dapp_discovered=false)── Wallet
Dapp ──dapp_ready(supported=["hdwalletv1"], selected="hdwalletv1", wallet_discovered=true)──▶ Wallet
```
After step 3 the wallet sets `dappDiscovered = true`. No more ready messages unless a reconnect.
**Wallet reconnects (dapp still running, walletDiscovered=true):**
```
Dapp ──dapp_ready(wallet_discovered=true)──────────────────────────────▶ Wallet (proactive)
Dapp ◀──wallet_ready(dapp_discovered=false, session={...})────────────── Wallet (proactive)
Dapp ──dapp_ready(selected="hdwalletv1", wallet_discovered=true)────────▶ Wallet (reactive)
```
**Dapp reconnects (browser refresh, wallet still running):**
```
Dapp ──dapp_ready(wallet_discovered=false)──────────────────────────────▶ Wallet (proactive)
Dapp ◀──wallet_ready(dapp_discovered=true, session={...})─────────────── Wallet (reactive)
```
(No third message: `dapp_discovered=true` means the dapp does not need to send a reactive reply.)
#### Design decision: why mutual discovery?
An alternative is a fixed initiator/responder role (only the dapp initiates). That breaks when the
wallet reconnects while the dapp is still alive — the wallet would wait for a dapp message that
never comes because the dapp thinks the session is live. Mutual discovery means each side sends a
"hello" on reconnect without depending on the other side's state.
---
## hdwalletv1 protocol
The `hdwalletv1` session data is carried in `wallet_ready.session["hdwalletv1"]`. It delivers
everything the dapp needs to derive an unlimited number of addresses without further contact with
the wallet.
### Hdwalletv1Session
```typescript
interface Hdwalletv1Session {
paths: PathXpub[]; // BIP32 xpubs for each named path
extensions?: Record<string, unknown>; // optional extension capabilities and data
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}
```
Carried as `wallet_ready.session["hdwalletv1"]`. The dapp validates it with `isHdwalletv1Session()`.
The `extensions` field is optional. When present, each key is an extension name and its presence
indicates the wallet supports that extension. The value carries extension-specific handshake data,
or `{}` if no data is needed. See [extensions.md](extensions.md) for the full extension system.
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See [pubkey-derivation.md](pubkey-derivation.md) for the full xpub story.
### PathXpub
```typescript
interface PathXpub {
name: PathName; // "receive" | "change" | "defi"
xpub: string; // BIP32 base58-encoded extended public key
}
```
`name` is the protocol-level identifier. The dapp uses the name to know what kind of addresses to
derive from the xpub; it does not need to know (or care) where the wallet derived the xpub from.
**Highly recommended derivation paths.** To ensure addresses are recognised by other wallets and
blockchain explorers, wallets should derive xpubs from the standard BIP44 paths for BCH:
| Name | Recommended derivation path | Purpose |
|------|-----------------------------|---------|
| `receive` | `m/44'/145'/0'/0` | External receive addresses |
| `change` | `m/44'/145'/0'/1` | Internal change addresses |
| `defi` | `m/44'/145'/0'/7` | DeFi / Cauldron addresses |
Using these paths means the same addresses will appear in any BIP44-compatible wallet that holds
the same seed, making fund recovery straightforward.
**Privacy-first alternative: any path per session.** The protocol does not enforce the recommended
paths. A wallet that prioritises privacy may derive xpubs from non-standard or randomly-chosen
paths, and may even rotate them each session. The dapp derives addresses correctly regardless —
it never sees the path, only the xpub. The trade-off is that funds sent to session-specific paths
will not be found by standard wallet recovery tools without additional metadata.
**Design decision: names instead of child indices.** The protocol uses human-readable names rather
than numeric child indices because the derivation path is a wallet-internal detail. A name like
`"receive"` is stable and meaningful; the corresponding BIP44 index is an implementation concern
that only the wallet (and internal dapp state) need to know.
### PathName
```typescript
type PathName = string;
// Well-known path names:
const PATH_RECEIVE = "receive";
const PATH_CHANGE = "change";
const PATH_DEFI = "defi";
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```
`PathName` is an open string. The well-known values are:
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| Name | Recommended BIP44 path | Purpose |
|------|------------------------|---------|
| `receive` | `m/44'/145'/0'/0` | External receive addresses |
| `change` | `m/44'/145'/0'/1` | Internal change addresses |
| `defi` | `m/44'/145'/0'/7` | DeFi / Cauldron addresses |
Wallets may include additional paths via extensions (e.g. `stealth_scan`, `stealth_spend`, `rpa`).
Dapps should ignore path names they do not recognize. See [extensions.md](extensions.md) for
conventions on defining new path names.
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### sign_transaction_request
```typescript
interface SignTransactionRequest {
action: "sign_transaction_request";
transaction: WcSignTransactionRequest; // from @bch-wc2/interfaces
sequence: number;
inputPaths: [number, PathName, number][]; // [inputIndex, pathName, addressIndex]
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time: number;
}
```
`sequence` is a unique number generated by `RelayClient.nextSequence()`. It starts at a random
offset (to avoid collisions across sessions) and increments by 2 per call. The dapp uses `sequence`
to match responses to requests.
`WcSignTransactionRequest` describes a Bitcoin Cash transaction: inputs, outputs, source outputs
(for signing), version, locktime, and an optional `userPrompt` string shown to the user in the
wallet UI.
`inputPaths` is a sparse array of `[inputIndex, PathName, addressIndex]` tuples. Each entry identifies
the HD derivation path name and address index the dapp used to derive the locking script for the input
at position `inputIndex`. Only inputs that require wallet signing need an entry — contract inputs with
pre-set unlocking bytecode can be omitted. This allows the wallet to sign each input without scanning
or guessing which key was used.
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#### SIGHASH requirement (security-critical)
Wallets **MUST** sign every input with `SIGHASH_ALL | SIGHASH_FORKID | SIGHASH_UTXOS` and **MUST**
reject any request that would require different flags.
`SIGHASH_ALL` ensures the signature commits to the entire transaction (all inputs and all outputs).
Without it, an attacker could collect a valid signature and graft it onto a different transaction —
for example, using `SIGHASH_NONE` an attacker could replace every output to redirect funds.
Because `inputPaths` lets the dapp specify which key signs each input, the wallet no longer
independently verifies that the key matches the UTXO's locking bytecode. This is safe **only** when
`SIGHASH_ALL` is enforced: if the dapp provides a wrong path, the resulting signature is invalid
(public key hash mismatch) and the transaction cannot broadcast. Without `SIGHASH_ALL`, a
wrong-key signature could still be repurposed in a different transaction context.
Summary of the flags:
| Flag | Purpose |
|------|---------|
| `SIGHASH_ALL` | Commits to all inputs and outputs — prevents output substitution |
| `SIGHASH_FORKID` | Prevents cross-fork replay (BCH ↔ BTC) |
| `SIGHASH_UTXOS` | Commits to all input UTXOs — prevents input substitution after signing |
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### sign_transaction_response
```typescript
interface SignTransactionResponse {
action: "sign_transaction_response";
sequence: number;
signedTransaction: string; // hex-encoded fully signed transaction
error?: string; // if present, signing failed; signedTransaction is ""
time: number;
}
```
The wallet either returns the signed transaction hex or an error string. The dapp rejects the
pending Promise associated with the `sequence` in the error case.
### Re-delivery on reconnect
If the wallet is not connected (or reconnects) while a `sign_transaction_request` is in flight,
the dapp automatically re-sends all pending requests when it receives `wallet_ready`. This
handles the common case where the user triggers a transaction in the dapp and then opens the
wallet app several seconds later.
The wallet deduplicates incoming requests by `sequence` number — if it has already emitted
`pendingSignRequest` for a given sequence and has not yet responded, the duplicate is silently
dropped. The dedup guard is cleared when the wallet sends a response (`sign_transaction_response`)
or receives a `sign_cancel`.
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### sign_cancel
```typescript
interface SignCancelMessage {
action: "sign_cancel";
sequence: number; // must match the sequence of the sign_transaction_request being cancelled
reason?: string; // optional human-readable explanation
time: number;
}
```
Sent by the **dapp only** to cancel an in-flight `sign_transaction_request`. The wallet should
dismiss the corresponding sign dialog immediately upon receipt.
Use cases:
- User presses cancel on the dapp side while waiting for the wallet to sign.
- Dapp replaces a stale request with a new one (e.g., trade price has changed).
**Dapp side** (`DappConnectionManager`):
- `sendSignCancel(sequence, reason?)` — immediately rejects the pending Promise for that sequence,
then sends `sign_cancel` to the wallet.
**Wallet side** (`WalletConnectionManager`):
- Incoming `sign_cancel` emits a `signCancelled` event (`connectionId`, `sequence`, `reason`).
The host app is responsible for dismissing the sign dialog.
---
## disconnect
Either side may send a `disconnect` message before tearing down the relay connection. This is a
courtesy notification — the remote side treats the connection as closed immediately upon receipt
(no acknowledgement).
fix(wallet): deliver the courtesy disconnect before tearing the relay down doDisconnect fired the courtesy `disconnect` message without awaiting it, then tore the relay connection down on the next line: conn.client.relay(disconnectMsg).catch(() => {}); // fire and forget ... conn.cleanup(); // closes the pool underneath it relay() resolves only after `Promise.allSettled(pool.publish(...))` — a real round trip to every configured relay. cleanup() closed the pool while that publish was still in flight, so the message usually never left and the dapp went on believing the wallet was connected until its own liveness timeout fired. Downstream wallets were patching this out of the published package. Teardown now splits into two halves with opposite timing requirements. Registry removal stays synchronous. getConnections() is what a UI renders, and connect() returns an existing connection for a URI, so leaving this one in the map while its teardown is pending would hand a caller a dying connection. This is the one place this differs from !30 and from the downstream patches, which defer the registry removal along with the teardown. Relay teardown is deferred until the publish settles, bounded by DISCONNECT_PUBLISH_TIMEOUT_MS (5s). The bound matters: "the publish never settles" is exactly the case where a relay is unreachable, and a socket that is never closed is worse than a courtesy message that is never delivered. disconnect() keeps its synchronous void signature — not a breaking change. Why it shipped broken: disconnect.test.ts only covered dapp → wallet. Nothing exercised wallet → dapp, and the failure is invisible from the wallet's side — its own state is correct either way, and only the peer notices. disconnect-delivery.test.ts covers that direction over a live relay, including the two invariants the deferral must not break (registry cleared immediately, URI reusable afterwards). Also fixes a latent hang in the integration harness that the new file exposed. setupConnection gated both the dapp_ready send and the message handler inside the keyexchangecomplete callback, so the handshake hung on receiving the wallet's single wallet_ready for the cycle. Miss it — the dapp's subscription can come up after the wallet has already published — and key exchange never resolves, the handler never registers, no dapp_ready is ever sent, and the wallet, guarded by walletReadySentThisCycle, has nothing prompting it to retry. It now re-announces dapp_ready(wallet_discovered=false) every 2s until key exchange completes, which resets that guard and earns another wallet_ready: the recovery path mutual discovery already specifies, which the harness was not using. Plus retry: 2 on the integration config, since these tests talk to live relays and a dropped connection is an environment failure rather than a regression. docs/wallet.md gains a "Sending disconnect" section for the synchronous/deferred split and what a caller may rely on. docs/protocol.md gains the sender-side half of the courtesy-disconnect semantics, which previously read as though "no acknowledgement" licensed fire-and-forget. That reading is what produced the bug. The race was diagnosed and first fixed by hantyrram (Ronaldo Ramano) in !30, which this supersedes — the deferral is their fix; this changes only how it is scoped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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No acknowledgement does not mean fire-and-forget on the sender's side. `relay()` resolves only
after the publish has been settled against every configured relay, so the sender must keep the
relay connection open until then — closing it first kills the publish in flight and the peer
never learns of the disconnect. Sending a courtesy `disconnect` and immediately tearing the
transport down is the same as not sending one.
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```typescript
enum DisconnectReason {
ProtocolMismatch = "protocol_mismatch", // no common protocol found during handshake
UserDisconnect = "user_disconnect", // explicit user or application action
}
interface DisconnectMessage {
action: "disconnect";
reason: DisconnectReason;
message?: string; // optional human-readable detail
time: number;
}
```
**Wallet side** (`WalletConnectionManager`):
fix(wallet): deliver the courtesy disconnect before tearing the relay down doDisconnect fired the courtesy `disconnect` message without awaiting it, then tore the relay connection down on the next line: conn.client.relay(disconnectMsg).catch(() => {}); // fire and forget ... conn.cleanup(); // closes the pool underneath it relay() resolves only after `Promise.allSettled(pool.publish(...))` — a real round trip to every configured relay. cleanup() closed the pool while that publish was still in flight, so the message usually never left and the dapp went on believing the wallet was connected until its own liveness timeout fired. Downstream wallets were patching this out of the published package. Teardown now splits into two halves with opposite timing requirements. Registry removal stays synchronous. getConnections() is what a UI renders, and connect() returns an existing connection for a URI, so leaving this one in the map while its teardown is pending would hand a caller a dying connection. This is the one place this differs from !30 and from the downstream patches, which defer the registry removal along with the teardown. Relay teardown is deferred until the publish settles, bounded by DISCONNECT_PUBLISH_TIMEOUT_MS (5s). The bound matters: "the publish never settles" is exactly the case where a relay is unreachable, and a socket that is never closed is worse than a courtesy message that is never delivered. disconnect() keeps its synchronous void signature — not a breaking change. Why it shipped broken: disconnect.test.ts only covered dapp → wallet. Nothing exercised wallet → dapp, and the failure is invisible from the wallet's side — its own state is correct either way, and only the peer notices. disconnect-delivery.test.ts covers that direction over a live relay, including the two invariants the deferral must not break (registry cleared immediately, URI reusable afterwards). Also fixes a latent hang in the integration harness that the new file exposed. setupConnection gated both the dapp_ready send and the message handler inside the keyexchangecomplete callback, so the handshake hung on receiving the wallet's single wallet_ready for the cycle. Miss it — the dapp's subscription can come up after the wallet has already published — and key exchange never resolves, the handler never registers, no dapp_ready is ever sent, and the wallet, guarded by walletReadySentThisCycle, has nothing prompting it to retry. It now re-announces dapp_ready(wallet_discovered=false) every 2s until key exchange completes, which resets that guard and earns another wallet_ready: the recovery path mutual discovery already specifies, which the harness was not using. Plus retry: 2 on the integration config, since these tests talk to live relays and a dropped connection is an environment failure rather than a regression. docs/wallet.md gains a "Sending disconnect" section for the synchronous/deferred split and what a caller may rely on. docs/protocol.md gains the sender-side half of the courtesy-disconnect semantics, which previously read as though "no acknowledgement" licensed fire-and-forget. That reading is what produced the bug. The race was diagnosed and first fixed by hantyrram (Ronaldo Ramano) in !30, which this supersedes — the deferral is their fix; this changes only how it is scoped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 16:29:34 +02:00
- `disconnect(id)` sends `UserDisconnect`, then tears the connection down once the publish
settles — bounded, so an unreachable relay cannot hold the socket open. The connection leaves
the registry synchronously. See [wallet.md § Sending disconnect](wallet.md#sending-disconnect).
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- Incoming `disconnect` emits a `remoteDisconnect` event
(`connectionId`, `reason`, `message`) and removes the connection.
**Dapp side** (`DappConnectionManager`):
- `sendDisconnect(message?)` sends `UserDisconnect`. Caller then calls `dappRelay.cleanup()`.
- Protocol mismatch during `handleWalletReady` sends `ProtocolMismatch` and emits a `disconnect`
event (`reason`, `message`).
- Incoming `disconnect` emits a `disconnect` event.
---
## Type guards
`@wizardconnect/core` exports runtime type guards for all protocol messages:
```typescript
isProtocolMessage(obj) → ProtocolMessage
isDappReadyMessage(obj) → DappReadyMessage
isWalletReadyMessage(obj) → WalletReadyMessage
isDisconnectMessage(obj) → DisconnectMessage
isHdwalletv1Session(obj) → Hdwalletv1Session
isPathXpub(obj) → PathXpub
isErrorMessage(obj) → ErrorMessage
isSignTransactionRequest(obj) → SignTransactionRequest
isSignCancelMessage(obj) → SignCancelMessage
```
These are used internally to validate incoming messages before dispatch.
## Helper: childIndexOfPathName
```typescript
function childIndexOfPathName(name: PathName): number | undefined
// "receive" → 0, "change" → 1, "defi" → 7, unknown → undefined
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```
The protocol uses string names for paths, but code that manages key state internally (such as
`DappPubkeyStateManager`) keys its maps by numeric child index. This helper converts between the
two representations for the well-known path names. It returns `undefined` for extension path names
(e.g. `"stealth_scan"`). Callers must handle the `undefined` case — typically by skipping the path.
It is not a protocol concern — the numeric indices never appear on the wire.