Wires the Bitcoin Signed Message primitives into the protocol: a dapp can ask a
wallet to prove control of a key, and gets back a signature any third party can
check from the message and an address alone.
WIRE FORMAT
SignMessageRequest extends WcSignMessageRequest from @bch-wc2/interfaces — the
interface wallets already implement for WalletConnect — so the request object can
be handed straight to an existing WC2 signMessage handler. hdwalletv1 adds only
the optional key selection, mirroring how SignTransactionRequest wraps
WcSignTransactionRequest and adds inputPaths. That also brings `userPrompt` along,
which is dapp-supplied and unsigned; docs/wallet.md says to render it as
subordinate to the message, because presented as equal it lets a dapp caption
hostile text reassuringly.
Two key-selection modes, advertised separately from `schemes` because they are
independent capabilities — a wallet may sign with a dapp-named path yet have no
notion of a stable identity key, and a dapp that checked only for the extension
would find that out after the user clicked a login button:
dapp_path dapp sends path + addressIndex; needs that path's xpub
wallet_choice dapp sends neither; wallet picks and returns the address
wallet_choice exists because requiring an xpub to prove control of one key means
sharing the user's whole address history. It is the privacy-preserving option for
identity, and the one the WC2 interface already implies. A wallet advertising it
must choose deterministically or a returning user is unrecognisable.
The response is a discriminated union on `error`, so a caller cannot read
`.address` off a rejection and treat an empty string as an identity. publicKey and
address are required on success: under wallet_choice they are the dapp's only way
to learn which key answered.
WALLET SIDE
signMessage is optional; implementing it is what advertises the extension, so the
handshake cannot claim support an adapter does not have. An adapter that declares
the key itself wins — the automatic advertisement never overwrites it.
SignMessageResult carries only the signature. The public key and address are
recoverable from it and the manager derives them that way, so the three values
cannot disagree and an adapter cannot claim a proof about an address it did not
prove. The manager then compares the recovered key against the adapter's own key
for the path. Recovery alone cannot catch a signature over the wrong text — it
succeeds and yields some other key — so that comparison is what turns a wallet-side
derivation or encoding bug into an error at the call site rather than an opaque
rejection across the relay.
Requests are answered rather than dropped: an unsupported scheme, an unsupported
mode, a malformed request or a wallet with no signMessage all produce an error
response, checked before the user is prompted so nobody approves a signature we
cannot produce.
Dedup shares the sequence set with transaction signing. That is correct rather
than convenient: every sequence comes from one per-connection counter
(RelayClient.nextSequence), so a sequence identifies a request regardless of kind
— which is also what lets one sign_cancel cancel either.
DAPP SIDE
signMessage() resolves only after this library has verified the result: the
signature recovers over the message that was sent, publicKey is the key that
signed, address is that key's address, and — when the dapp named a path it can
derive — the signer is exactly the key it asked for. Anything inconsistent
rejects. Without that last check a wallet could answer with a signature from any
key and a naive dapp would accept it as the identity it asked about.
keyBinding reports whether that comparison happened, because "the wallet chose a
key" and "this is the key I asked for" are different claims and only one is an
identity the dapp selected. A derivable path with no xpub available is an error,
not an unchecked result.
No default timeout: cancellation is explicit via AbortSignal, matching
signTransaction. Picking a deadline for a user approving on a phone is worse than
letting the dapp decide.
EXTENSION SHAPE
Actions live in RelayMsgAction and are handled by the managers, rather than riding
the generic message events described in docs/extensions.md § 3. That is a new
pattern, not an existing convention — the only prior enum-plus-advertisement
capability is `chunk`, which is transport-level and outside the hdwalletv1
extension system entirely. It is documented as new under § First-party
extensions: third-party extensions define their own actions and are handled by the
host app; capabilities this library ships get manager support, because otherwise
every consumer hand-rolls the plumbing for a feature we already implement.
TESTS
24 wallet, 26 dapp, and 8 over a live relay. The integration test matters most:
NIP-17 gift wrapping, JSON encoding, relay storage and replay all sit between the
two sides, and it asserts the message arrives byte-identical, that a multi-byte
message is not re-encoded in transit, that a replayed request prompts once, and
that the resulting signature verifies from the address alone. makeTestAdapter
gained a real signMessage — it already holds HD keys, so there was nothing to
fake.
test-cli gains `--sign-message [dapp_path|wallet_choice]` and a wallet-side
approval path, so the flow can be driven by hand against a real wallet. It signs
a plain test message, not a login: a login needs a single-use nonce, a domain and
an expiry, and signing something that merely looks like one would be a bad
pattern to copy.
Docs: protocol.md, extensions.md, wallet.md, dapp.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Dapps have been asking for message signing to prove key control — identity
verification, SIWX-style login, and publishing a signed statement on chain. This
adds the construction and the verification; the protocol wiring follows
separately.
The known workaround is a dummy transaction: one input with a null outpoint, its
prevout script set to the P2PKH of the key being proven, one OP_RETURN output
carrying a server nonce, signed but never broadcast. It covers login, but not the
rest. A signature made that way is bound to a transaction, so verifying it means
rebuilding that exact transaction and knowing how it was serialised — it cannot
be published in an OP_RETURN and checked later by a third party holding only the
message, the signature and an address. It also asks a wallet to sign a real
transaction preimage, which is one bug away from signing a genuine spend.
So this produces the portable form: the standard "Bitcoin Signed Message"
construction. BCH wallets kept Bitcoin's magic string verbatim, so a signature
made here verifies in Electron Cash, Electrum and `bitcoin-cli verifymessage`.
The magic prefix also guarantees the digest can never coincide with a transaction
sighash, which makes signing a message categorically safer to approve than
signing a dummy transaction.
Address-level API, because that is what verification actually looks like
elsewhere: Electron Cash exposes only `verify_message(address, sig, message)`,
and a third party pulling a proof off an explorer has an address, not a public
key. verifyMessageSignatureForAddress accepts CashAddr with or without a prefix
and legacy base58, and rejects P2SH — no message signature can prove control of a
script hash.
recoverMessageSigner returns { publicKey, compressed } rather than a bare key.
The header byte declares which serialisation was used, and a key's compressed and
uncompressed forms hash to DIFFERENT addresses. Dropping that bit is how a
signature proving control of one address gets accepted as proof of another;
message-signing.test.ts pins the case in both directions.
signBitcoinMessage takes the private key as an argument and never retains it. It
exists so a wallet calls one function instead of reassembling the magic string,
both compactSize prefixes and the header byte — the parts third-party verifiers
check, and the parts covered by the tests here.
Testing: the byte layout is not asserted against our own reimplementation of the
spec, because that catches a coding mistake but not a misreading of it.
message-signing.vectors.json holds 32 vectors generated by a real Electron Cash
4.4.5 install (contrib/generate-message-signing-vectors.py) — two keys, both
compression forms, eight messages including empty, multi-byte UTF-8, multi-line
and the 252/253-byte compactSize boundary. Every preimage hash must match byte
for byte, and every signature must verify. Signature bytes are NOT portable
across implementations — Electron Cash and libauth derive the ECDSA nonce
differently — so the reproducible quantity is the hash.
message-signing.compat.test.ts drives `electron-cash verifymessage` directly,
closing the loop that vectors cannot: that our OUTPUT is accepted. Not part of
`npm test` (each assertion spawns a full Electron Cash process); run
`npm run test:compat -w @wizardconnect/core`. Skips when Electron Cash is
absent, so CI is unaffected.
77 tests, 426 in core.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Splits ProtocolMessages exceeding NIP-44's 65,535-byte plaintext ceiling
across multiple gift-wrapped events. Symmetric (both directions),
fire-and-forget, backward-compatible via a new transport-level
\`extensions\` field on \`dapp_ready\` and \`wallet_ready\`. Resolves the
\"Failed to swap: invalid plaintext size\" error on aggregated swap
requests and enables signed-tx responses up to the 1 MB BCH consensus
limit (~2 MB hex).
Keep session persistance by default, such that when reloading a dapp,
the wizardconnect session is kept alive.
Improve signature request interface. Simplify the react API.
User may need some time to open their wallet to approve signature
request and miss it.
If we have a active request, re-send it if we see a
wallet_ready signal, suggesting the wallet was just opened.
Replace placeholder 'bip352' / 'bip47_rpa' with the finalized
extension names from the BCR post and BCH Stealth Protocol spec:
- bip352 → bch_stealth_bip352
- bip47_rpa → rpa_bip47
Add spend_path / scan_path fields to each extension handshake
object, pointing to the hardened gate paths where the wallet
exports xpubs. Dapps derive the non-hardened /0 child locally.
Add rpa_spend / rpa_scan path names alongside stealth_spend /
stealth_scan in all examples. Update known extensions table with
full path information and BCR reference links.
Spec: https://bitcoincashresearch.org/t/ecdh-stealth-addresses-on-bitcoin-cash-implementation-code/1773/5
I have read the CLA Document and I hereby sign the CLA
This backward compatible change allows wallets/dapps to add additional
features outside the basic transaction signature support to the
hdwalletv1 protocol.
The package nostr-dev-kit was using a dependency (tseep) which
downstream would flag as not CSP-safe.
Additionally nostr-tools footprint is much smaller.
Canonical encoding for BigInt (<bigint: Xn>) and Uint8Array (hex or
<Uint8Array: 0x...>) used in the relay protocol. Provides both
serialization (sourceOutputToRelay, transactionToHex) and deserialization
(parseExtendedJson, toUint8Array, toBigInt) so dapps and wallets
don't have to implement this independently.
The useWizardConnect hook now saves PathXpub[] from wallet_ready into
the localStorage session. On auto-reconnect, restoreSessionPaths() is
called so getPubkey() works immediately without waiting for the wallet.
Corrupt cached paths are cleared with a warning.
Allows dapps to cache the raw PathXpub[] from wallet_ready and restore
them on subsequent page loads. restoreSessionPaths decodes the xpub strings
and populates pubkeyState so getPubkey() works without waiting for the
wallet to reconnect. Throws on invalid xpub data.
