// BNS local certificate authority.
// The chain binds name -> owner; this CA binds name -> TLS key on machines that
// install its root ("make our own https").
//
// The root is NAME-CONSTRAINED (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.10) to the TLDs in tlds.js and
// excluded from all IP addresses. That matters because install.ps1 puts this
// root in the machine trust store: an unconstrained root would mean whoever can
// read ca/root-ca.key could mint a trusted certificate for *any* domain — the
// user's bank included. With constraints, the worst case is limited to names
// this project already governs.
//
// ca/root-ca.key is still a secret worth protecting (it can forge any name under
// the permitted TLDs), it is generated per machine, and it must never ship.
import forge from "node-forge";
import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from "fs";
import { fileURLToPath } from "url";
import { PERMITTED_TLDS, isPermittedHost } from "./tlds.js";

const CA_DIR = fileURLToPath(new URL("../../ca/", import.meta.url));
const KEY_FILE = CA_DIR + "root-ca.key";
const CERT_FILE = CA_DIR + "root-ca.crt";

const NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID = "2.5.29.30";

function makeCert(publicKey, subjectAttrs, issuerAttrs, extensions, years) {
  const cert = forge.pki.createCertificate();
  cert.publicKey = publicKey;
  cert.serialNumber = "00" + forge.util.bytesToHex(forge.random.getBytesSync(8));
  cert.validity.notBefore = new Date();
  cert.validity.notAfter = new Date();
  cert.validity.notAfter.setFullYear(cert.validity.notBefore.getFullYear() + years);
  cert.setSubject(subjectAttrs);
  cert.setIssuer(issuerAttrs);
  cert.setExtensions(extensions);
  return cert;
}

// NameConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
//   permittedSubtrees [0] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL,
//   excludedSubtrees  [1] GeneralSubtrees OPTIONAL }
// GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE { base GeneralName, ... }
// GeneralName: dNSName is [2] IA5String, iPAddress is [7] OCTET STRING.
//
// node-forge has no nameConstraints support, so this is hand-built ASN.1 handed
// to forge as a raw extension.
function nameConstraintsExt(tlds) {
  const { asn1 } = forge;
  const CS = asn1.Class.CONTEXT_SPECIFIC;
  const seq = (v) => asn1.create(asn1.Class.UNIVERSAL, asn1.Type.SEQUENCE, true, v);

  const dnsSubtree = (tld) => seq([asn1.create(CS, 2, false, tld)]);
  // In a constraint an iPAddress base is address||mask. All-zero address with an
  // all-zero mask is "every address", so excluding it bars every IP-address SAN
  // for both IPv4 (4+4 bytes) and IPv6 (16+16).
  const ipSubtree = (len) => seq([asn1.create(CS, 7, false, "\0".repeat(len))]);

  const nc = seq([
    asn1.create(CS, 0, true, tlds.map(dnsSubtree)),
    asn1.create(CS, 1, true, [ipSubtree(8), ipSubtree(32)]),
  ]);
  // RFC 5280: "Conforming CAs MUST mark this extension as critical."
  return { id: NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID, critical: true, value: asn1.toDer(nc).getBytes() };
}

// Pull the permitted dNSName bases back out of an existing root, so we can tell
// whether it still matches the configured TLD list. Returns null if the cert
// carries no name-constraints extension at all (i.e. a pre-constraint root).
function readPermittedDns(cert) {
  const ext = (cert.extensions ?? []).find((e) => e.id === NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID);
  if (!ext) return null;
  try {
    const der = typeof ext.value === "string" ? ext.value : forge.asn1.toDer(ext.value).getBytes();
    const nc = forge.asn1.fromDer(der);
    const permitted = nc.value.find((v) => v.type === 0 && v.tagClass === forge.asn1.Class.CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
    if (!permitted) return [];
    return permitted.value
      .map((sub) => sub.value?.[0])
      .filter((gn) => gn && gn.type === 2)
      .map((gn) => gn.value);
  } catch {
    return [];
  }
}

function sameSet(a, b) {
  return a.length === b.length && [...a].sort().join() === [...b].sort().join();
}

// The permitted-TLD list for the root CA's nameConstraints extension.
// Callers can pass the chain-derived list (fetchBcnrTlds) to keep the CA in
// step with the on-chain root TLD certificate; otherwise falls back to the
// shipped PERMITTED_TLDS. Doc reference: START-HERE.md Section 1.
export function loadOrCreateRootCA(permittedTlds) {
  const tlds = Array.isArray(permittedTlds) && permittedTlds.length
    ? permittedTlds.map((t) => String(t).toLowerCase())
    : PERMITTED_TLDS;
  mkdirSync(CA_DIR, { recursive: true });
  if (existsSync(KEY_FILE) && existsSync(CERT_FILE)) {
    const cert = forge.pki.certificateFromPem(readFileSync(CERT_FILE, "utf8"));
    const permitted = readPermittedDns(cert);
    if (permitted === null) {
      console.error(
        "\n*** SECURITY: ca/root-ca.crt has NO name constraints ***\n" +
        "    This root was generated before constraints were added. While it is in the\n" +
        "    machine trust store, anyone who can read ca/root-ca.key can mint a trusted\n" +
        "    certificate for ANY domain on this machine, not just BNS names.\n" +
        "    Rotate it:  setup\\uninstall.ps1  ->  delete ca\\  ->  setup\\install.ps1\n",
      );
    } else if (!sameSet(permitted, tlds)) {
      console.error(
        `\n*** ca/root-ca.crt is constrained to [${permitted.join(", ")}] but the requested ` +
        `TLD list is [${tlds.join(", ")}].\n` +
        "    Certificates for the newly-configured TLDs will be REJECTED by clients until the\n" +
        "    root is regenerated and re-imported (uninstall -> delete ca\\ -> install).\n",
      );
    }
    return { key: forge.pki.privateKeyFromPem(readFileSync(KEY_FILE, "utf8")), cert };
  }

  const keys = forge.pki.rsa.generateKeyPair(2048);
  const attrs = [
    { name: "commonName", value: "BNS Local Root CA" },
    { name: "organizationName", value: "BNS (.bch on Bitcoin Cash)" },
  ];
  const cert = makeCert(keys.publicKey, attrs, attrs, [
    { name: "basicConstraints", cA: true, critical: true },
    { name: "keyUsage", keyCertSign: true, cRLSign: true, critical: true },
    // Distinguishes THIS root from any prior "BNS Local Root CA" that a rotate
    // left orphaned in Firefox's NSS store. Without an SKI, Firefox's chain
    // builder picks a candidate root by Subject DN alone -- and every regenerated
    // root has the same DN -- so it can pick the wrong pubkey and reject valid
    // leaves with SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE.
    { name: "subjectKeyIdentifier" },
    nameConstraintsExt(tlds),
  ], 10);
  cert.sign(keys.privateKey, forge.md.sha256.create());
  writeFileSync(KEY_FILE, forge.pki.privateKeyToPem(keys.privateKey));
  writeFileSync(CERT_FILE, forge.pki.certificateToPem(cert));
  console.error(`created new BNS Local Root CA in ca/ -- constrained to: ${tlds.join(", ")}`);
  return { key: keys.privateKey, cert };
}

// One leaf keypair per process, reused for every name this daemon serves.
// Generating RSA-2048 per hostname is what made on-the-fly issuance a denial-of-
// service vector (see bnsd.js SNI handling). All leaves are served by this same
// process anyway, so a shared key concedes nothing that was separated before.
let leafKeys = null;
function leafKeyPair() {
  if (!leafKeys) leafKeys = forge.pki.rsa.generateKeyPair(2048);
  return leafKeys;
}

// Issue a leaf certificate for a BNS hostname, signed by the local root.
// Throws for hostnames outside the permitted TLDs: the root's own constraints
// would make such a certificate useless anyway, and refusing here keeps callers
// from burning work on names that can never validate.
export function issueCert(hostname) {
  if (!isPermittedHost(hostname)) {
    throw new Error(
      `refusing to issue a certificate for "${hostname}" — not under a permitted TLD ` +
      `(${PERMITTED_TLDS.join(", ")}). See src/lib/tlds.js.`,
    );
  }
  const ca = loadOrCreateRootCA();
  const keys = leafKeyPair();
  // Derive the CA's SubjectKeyIdentifier so the leaf can point at *this
  // specific* root, not any other "CN=BNS Local Root CA" a prior install
  // may have left orphaned in Firefox's NSS store. Uses node-forge's own
  // generator so this matches the value written into the root's SKI
  // extension byte-for-byte (RFC 3280 §4.2.1.2 method 1 over RSAPublicKey).
  const caSki = ca.cert.generateSubjectKeyIdentifier().getBytes();
  const cert = makeCert(
    keys.publicKey,
    [{ name: "commonName", value: hostname }],
    ca.cert.subject.attributes,
    [
      { name: "basicConstraints", cA: false, critical: true },
      { name: "keyUsage", digitalSignature: true, keyEncipherment: true, critical: true },
      { name: "extKeyUsage", serverAuth: true },
      { name: "subjectAltName", altNames: [{ type: 2, value: hostname }] },
      { name: "authorityKeyIdentifier", keyIdentifier: caSki },
    ],
    2,
  );
  cert.sign(ca.key, forge.md.sha256.create());
  return {
    keyPem: forge.pki.privateKeyToPem(keys.privateKey),
    certPem: forge.pki.certificateToPem(cert),
    fingerprint: certFingerprint(forge.pki.certificateToPem(cert)),
  };
}

// SHA-256 over the DER encoding, hex — what a "tls" chain record pins.
export function certFingerprint(certPem) {
  const der = forge.asn1
    .toDer(forge.pki.certificateToAsn1(forge.pki.certificateFromPem(certPem)))
    .getBytes();
  const md = forge.md.sha256.create();
  md.update(der);
  return md.digest().toHex();
}