Expiry was always going to be the chain refusing, not resolvers agreeing. This is that contract: a certificate sits in a covenant whose address encodes its owner and expiry, and five paths move it. The owner renews, transfers, releases or migrates; anyone takes over an expired name at a price that glides from a premium to a floor, paying the previous owner a share while the grace period lasts and committing to the name a block ahead. The two changing values are the last constructor arguments, so they sit first in the redeem script and the contract re-creates itself by swapping 26 bytes. A resolver that knows the code can check any claimed owner and expiry against the address. Every number comes from registry-lifecycle.js, which was written as the fixture for this. The tests run each path in libauth's VM under the 2025 and 2026 rules, compare price and split to that model along the glide, and then break one rule at a time with valid signatures; the suite counts that the VM itself refused them. Draft, not reviewed, and not wired into any resolver. REGISTRY-COVENANT-v1.md says where it departs from the design: script cannot bound a height from above, so reclaim has no deadline and a commit cannot expire, which leaves commit hoarding open. That is the first thing a reviewer should read.
160 lines
8.5 KiB
Text
160 lines
8.5 KiB
Text
pragma cashscript ^0.13.0;
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// NameRegistry v1 — the covenant that holds a name certificate and enforces
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// its lifecycle (Decentralized.DNS/DESIGN-covenant-registry.md).
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//
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// STATUS: chipnet draft. NOT REVIEWED. A flaw here either locks every name
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// forever or lets anyone take one; nothing built from this file may hold a
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// mainnet name until someone who did not write it has reviewed it.
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//
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// The certificate (an immutable NFT whose commitment is the name) sits in an
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// output locked by this script. Two values change over a name's life — who
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// owns it and when it expires — and they are the LAST two constructor
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// arguments, which CashScript pushes FIRST. The redeem script therefore begins
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//
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// 0x14 <ownerPkh:20> 0x04 <expiry:4> <everything else>
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//
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// and every path that keeps the name re-creates the covenant by replacing
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// those 26 bytes and requiring output 0 to be locked to the result. One
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// contract, one code hash per price tier; the state is in the address.
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//
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// Numbers must match Argus/src/lib/registry-lifecycle.js, which is the
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// reference: integer arithmetic, multiply before dividing.
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//
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// What script cannot do, stated once: it can prove a block height has been
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// REACHED (tx.time), never that one has NOT. So "the owner may reclaim only
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// until the grace period ends" is not enforceable; an owner can renew for as
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// long as nobody has taken the name over. The takeover price is safe against
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// this: a taker can only claim a height that is already past, and a later
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// height means a lower price they are entitled to anyway.
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contract NameRegistry(
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// ---- fixed for this covenant version and price tier ----
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bytes fundLock, // locking bytecode the fund's payments must go to
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pubkey stewardPk, // approves the CODE of a newer covenant version (migrate)
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bytes commitBoxCode, // redeem-script body of the CommitBox contract
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int renewalSats, // price of one year, for the owner
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int premiumSats, // takeover price at the moment of expiry
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int floorSats, // takeover price once the grace period has run out
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int graceBlocks, // length of the grace period
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int blocksPerYear,
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int ownerPercentIdle, // previous owner's share of a takeover during grace
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// ---- state: keep these LAST, in this order ----
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bytes4 expiry, // block height the paid period ends at
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bytes20 ownerPkh
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) {
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// Keep the name: pay for `years` more. Also the reclaim path — an expired
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// name renews exactly the same way, from its old expiry.
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function renew(pubkey pk, sig s, int years) {
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require(hash160(pk) == ownerPkh);
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require(checkSig(s, pk));
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require(years >= 1);
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int newExpiry = int(expiry) + years * blocksPerYear;
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bytes newState = 0x14 + ownerPkh + 0x04 + toPaddedBytes(newExpiry, 4);
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bytes32 newHash = hash256(newState + this.activeBytecode.split(26)[1]);
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require(tx.outputs[0].lockingBytecode == new LockingBytecodeP2SH32(newHash));
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require(tx.outputs[0].tokenCategory == tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].tokenCategory);
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require(tx.outputs[0].nftCommitment == tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].nftCommitment);
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require(tx.outputs[0].value >= tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].value);
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require(tx.outputs[1].lockingBytecode == fundLock);
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require(tx.outputs[1].value >= renewalSats * years);
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require(tx.outputs[1].tokenCategory == 0x);
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}
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// Hand the name to another key (a sale, a gift), or re-create it for the
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// same key — which is how records are updated: the certificate has to move
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// for a resolver to accept an UPD. Expiry is untouched.
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function transfer(pubkey pk, sig s, bytes20 newOwnerPkh) {
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require(hash160(pk) == ownerPkh);
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require(checkSig(s, pk));
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bytes newState = 0x14 + newOwnerPkh + 0x04 + expiry;
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bytes32 newHash = hash256(newState + this.activeBytecode.split(26)[1]);
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require(tx.outputs[0].lockingBytecode == new LockingBytecodeP2SH32(newHash));
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require(tx.outputs[0].tokenCategory == tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].tokenCategory);
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require(tx.outputs[0].nftCommitment == tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].nftCommitment);
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require(tx.outputs[0].value >= tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].value);
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}
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// Take an expired name. No owner signature: anyone may, at a price that
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// glides from premiumSats at expiry down to floorSats at the end of the
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// grace period and stays there. During grace the previous owner is paid
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// ownerPercentIdle of the price; afterwards the fund receives all of it.
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//
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// Input 1 must be a CommitBox the taker created at least a block earlier,
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// committing to this name and to their own key. It hides which name is
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// wanted until the takeover itself, so the transaction cannot be copied
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// from the mempool by someone who had not already committed.
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function takeover(bytes20 newOwnerPkh, bytes salt) {
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int expiryHeight = int(expiry);
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require(tx.time >= expiryHeight);
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int height = tx.locktime;
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require(height < 500000000); // a block height, not a timestamp
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int idleEnd = expiryHeight + graceBlocks;
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int price = floorSats;
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int ownerSats = 0;
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if (height < idleEnd) {
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price = floorSats + (premiumSats - floorSats) * (idleEnd - height) / graceBlocks;
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ownerSats = price * ownerPercentIdle / 100;
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}
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// the commit
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bytes32 commitHash = hash256(tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].nftCommitment + salt);
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bytes boxRedeem = 0x14 + newOwnerPkh + 0x20 + commitHash + commitBoxCode;
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require(tx.inputs[1].lockingBytecode == new LockingBytecodeP2SH32(hash256(boxRedeem)));
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// the name, under its new owner, for one fresh year
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bytes newState = 0x14 + newOwnerPkh + 0x04 + toPaddedBytes(height + blocksPerYear, 4);
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bytes32 newHash = hash256(newState + this.activeBytecode.split(26)[1]);
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require(tx.outputs[0].lockingBytecode == new LockingBytecodeP2SH32(newHash));
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require(tx.outputs[0].tokenCategory == tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].tokenCategory);
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require(tx.outputs[0].nftCommitment == tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].nftCommitment);
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require(tx.outputs[0].value >= tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].value);
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// the money
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require(tx.outputs[1].lockingBytecode == fundLock);
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require(tx.outputs[1].value >= price - ownerSats);
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require(tx.outputs[1].tokenCategory == 0x);
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if (ownerSats > 0) {
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require(tx.outputs[2].lockingBytecode == new LockingBytecodeP2PKH(ownerPkh));
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require(tx.outputs[2].value >= ownerSats);
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require(tx.outputs[2].tokenCategory == 0x);
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}
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}
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// Give the name back: the certificate is destroyed. At most four outputs,
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// none of which may carry it — the owner cannot use this path to walk the
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// certificate out of the covenant into a plain wallet.
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function release(pubkey pk, sig s) {
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require(hash160(pk) == ownerPkh);
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require(checkSig(s, pk));
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bytes category = tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].tokenCategory;
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require(tx.outputs.length <= 4);
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require(tx.outputs[0].tokenCategory != category);
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if (tx.outputs.length > 1) { require(tx.outputs[1].tokenCategory != category); }
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if (tx.outputs.length > 2) { require(tx.outputs[2].tokenCategory != category); }
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if (tx.outputs.length > 3) { require(tx.outputs[3].tokenCategory != category); }
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}
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// Move to a newer covenant version. The owner chooses to; the steward has
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// signed the hash of the new version's CODE, once, for everyone. Neither
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// can act alone: the steward cannot move a name, and the owner cannot
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// migrate to a script the steward has not published. `newState` is whatever
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// the new version expects in front of its code.
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function migrate(pubkey pk, sig s, datasig approval, bytes newCode, bytes newState) {
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require(hash160(pk) == ownerPkh);
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require(checkSig(s, pk));
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require(checkDataSig(approval, hash256(newCode), stewardPk));
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bytes32 newHash = hash256(newState + newCode);
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require(tx.outputs[0].lockingBytecode == new LockingBytecodeP2SH32(newHash));
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require(tx.outputs[0].tokenCategory == tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].tokenCategory);
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require(tx.outputs[0].nftCommitment == tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].nftCommitment);
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require(tx.outputs[0].value >= tx.inputs[this.activeInputIndex].value);
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}
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}
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