prometheus/service/db.js

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prometheus: signed listings — BIP-137 publisher sign, SQLite index POST /api/listing accepts a JSON body with the manifest fields, a reference to a signed scan report from /api/upload, and a BIP-137 signature. Before the row lands in SQLite the service verifies three things: 1. the attached scan_report was signed by this service, is for the exact (hash, size) the listing claims, and the verdict is clean — a publisher cannot swap in a different file's clean report; 2. the publisher's signature recovers to a valid cashaddress, and that address matches the on-chain owner of the publisher's BNS name (gateway /api/name/<name>) — recovery alone is never enough per [[recovery-is-not-verification]]; 3. the usual shape checks: category in the allow-list, sha256 is 64 hex, download URL is http(s), slug matches [a-z0-9-]{1..64}, body under 1 MiB. GET /api/listings and GET /api/listings/<publisher>/<slug> are read-only endpoints the browse milestone will render from. MOCK_BNS_OWNER=<cashaddr> short-circuits the gateway call for local testing without a chipnet gateway reachable — same pattern as MOCK_SCAN. Dependencies: - @bitauth/libauth, for the secp256k1 primitives behind BIP-137 recovery and the cashaddress encoder. Same primitive Argus's registrar uses, so signatures from Argus-compatible wallets verify unchanged. - node:sqlite (ships with Node 22+) for the listings DB — one file next to the service, WAL journaling, no native build step. engines bumped to ">=22". Lifted service/lib/sign-message.js from Argus so Prometheus does not have to pull the resolver's whole dependency tree in for one verifier. Removed its NETWORK import; the default address prefix comes from BNS_NETWORK=chipnet|mainnet instead. INTERIM: no APS1 record on chain yet. The signed row IS the listing; when APS1 is defined cross-session the service will add an on-chain publish step that points at the same signed manifest. The browse and admin milestones can proceed against this DB in the meantime. scripts/test-listing-roundtrip.mjs drives the whole flow end-to-end with a deterministic test key, so a sanity check is a two-command sequence: start the server with MOCK_SCAN=clean + MOCK_BNS_OWNER=<the test address>, then run the script. Negative paths (fake scan report, bad category, duplicate slug) also verified by hand.
2026-10-08 01:48:12 +02:00
/**
* The listings database — a SQLite file next to the service.
*
* The service is small enough that one file + prepared statements beats a
* server-side DB, and node:sqlite (Node 22+) keeps that free from a native
* build step. Everything synchronous — fine for the volume we expect at
* launch, and the schema migrates easily to Postgres if volume forces it.
*
* The schema deliberately duplicates the publisher BNS name into the row:
* a listing is identified by `<publisher>/<slug>`, and that composite is
* what browse URLs point at. Changing a publisher name later would mean a
* new row, not an UPDATE — which matches reality (ownership transfers of a
* BNS name do not transfer the apps published under it).
*/
import { DatabaseSync } from 'node:sqlite';
import { mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
import { resolve, dirname } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
const DB_PATH = process.env.PROMETHEUS_DB
|| resolve(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), '..', 'db.sqlite');
mkdirSync(dirname(DB_PATH), { recursive: true });
export const db = new DatabaseSync(DB_PATH);
db.exec(`
PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL;
PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS listings (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
publisher TEXT NOT NULL,
slug TEXT NOT NULL,
name TEXT NOT NULL,
description TEXT NOT NULL,
category TEXT NOT NULL,
version TEXT NOT NULL,
homepage TEXT,
icon TEXT,
download_url TEXT NOT NULL,
download_sha256 TEXT NOT NULL,
download_size INTEGER NOT NULL,
scan_report TEXT NOT NULL, -- the base64url signed envelope from /api/upload
signer_address TEXT NOT NULL,
signature TEXT NOT NULL, -- the publisher's BIP-137 signature
signed_message TEXT NOT NULL, -- exact bytes the publisher signed
created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
withdrawn_at TEXT,
UNIQUE (publisher, slug)
);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_listings_category
ON listings(category) WHERE withdrawn_at IS NULL;
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_listings_publisher
ON listings(publisher);
prometheus: admin panel — login, listings, 3-mode toggle, audit log /admin is wallet-gated. The configured ADMIN_PUBLISHER is a BNS name; only the on-chain owner of that name can sign in. The sign-in flow is BIP-137 (same primitive publishers use): the login page shows a fresh one-shot challenge, the admin signs it in their wallet, pastes the signature, and the service verifies that it recovers to the current on-chain owner. Session is a 24-hour ed25519-signed cookie minted by the service key. Pages: /admin dashboard — totals, mode state, recent listings + audit /admin/login BIP-137 challenge sign-in /admin/listings all listings, with a Withdraw button per row /admin/modes global + per-category publish-mode toggle /admin/audit the hash-chained audit log The three publish modes exist as toggles: `append` — any valid listing goes in (launch default) `scan-first` — infected uploads are rejected before they land `review` — clean listings wait for human approval Global mode is the fallback; a per-category override takes precedence when set. The toggle persists; the review-queue enforcement lands in a later milestone (the enforcement sketch is in modes.js's header). Audit log: Every admin action (login, set_mode, clear_mode, withdraw_listing) is an append-only row with a sha256 chain over the previous row's hash. The chain does not prevent edits; it makes retroactive ones loud — row N's `prev_hash` disagreeing with row N-1's `this_hash` is the tamper signal. Withdrawal: Soft — `withdrawn_at` on the listing row. Browse hides withdrawn listings (already the case) and the detail page returns 404 for them. Nothing in the chain is undone; this is Prometheus's own view only. Session design: Cookie is `prom_admin=<payload b64url>.<signature b64url>`, signed with the ed25519 service key, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Path=/admin, 24-hour expiry. Reconfiguring ADMIN_PUBLISHER invalidates in-flight sessions by name mismatch. Challenges live in a 10-min TTL map and are tied to a specific name so one admin's challenge cannot authenticate another. Added: service/admin.js route handlers + dispatch service/admin-pages.js HTML templates for the four pages service/admin-session.js challenge + cookie mint/verify + readSession service/audit.js hash-chained append helper service/modes.js publish-mode read/write with override semantics schema: settings + audit tables scripts/test-admin-roundtrip.mjs drives the whole flow (unauth redirect → challenge scrape → sign → login → dashboard → set mode → audit inspection) with the same deterministic test key the listing-roundtrip script uses. Withdraw-flow spot-check: create a listing, log in as admin, withdraw it, confirm browse hides it and the detail page returns 404. All seven checks pass.
2026-10-08 21:35:48 +02:00
-- Operator-visible settings. Admin reads/writes through /admin/modes etc.
-- Values are text; callers coerce when they read.
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS settings (
key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
value TEXT NOT NULL,
updated_at TEXT NOT NULL,
updated_by TEXT -- admin BNS name, NULL for seeded defaults
);
-- Append-only hash-chained audit log. Every admin action lands a row; the
-- chain lets a later reader detect retroactive edits (if row N's prev_hash
-- does not match row N-1's this_hash, something was tampered with).
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit (
seq INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
at TEXT NOT NULL,
actor TEXT NOT NULL, -- admin BNS name
action TEXT NOT NULL, -- 'withdraw_listing', 'set_mode', 'login', …
target TEXT, -- a listing id, a mode key, …
details TEXT, -- canonical JSON of {before, after, note}
prev_hash TEXT NOT NULL, -- 64 hex of previous row's this_hash
this_hash TEXT NOT NULL -- sha256 over (seq||at||actor||action||target||details||prev_hash)
);
prometheus: signed listings — BIP-137 publisher sign, SQLite index POST /api/listing accepts a JSON body with the manifest fields, a reference to a signed scan report from /api/upload, and a BIP-137 signature. Before the row lands in SQLite the service verifies three things: 1. the attached scan_report was signed by this service, is for the exact (hash, size) the listing claims, and the verdict is clean — a publisher cannot swap in a different file's clean report; 2. the publisher's signature recovers to a valid cashaddress, and that address matches the on-chain owner of the publisher's BNS name (gateway /api/name/<name>) — recovery alone is never enough per [[recovery-is-not-verification]]; 3. the usual shape checks: category in the allow-list, sha256 is 64 hex, download URL is http(s), slug matches [a-z0-9-]{1..64}, body under 1 MiB. GET /api/listings and GET /api/listings/<publisher>/<slug> are read-only endpoints the browse milestone will render from. MOCK_BNS_OWNER=<cashaddr> short-circuits the gateway call for local testing without a chipnet gateway reachable — same pattern as MOCK_SCAN. Dependencies: - @bitauth/libauth, for the secp256k1 primitives behind BIP-137 recovery and the cashaddress encoder. Same primitive Argus's registrar uses, so signatures from Argus-compatible wallets verify unchanged. - node:sqlite (ships with Node 22+) for the listings DB — one file next to the service, WAL journaling, no native build step. engines bumped to ">=22". Lifted service/lib/sign-message.js from Argus so Prometheus does not have to pull the resolver's whole dependency tree in for one verifier. Removed its NETWORK import; the default address prefix comes from BNS_NETWORK=chipnet|mainnet instead. INTERIM: no APS1 record on chain yet. The signed row IS the listing; when APS1 is defined cross-session the service will add an on-chain publish step that points at the same signed manifest. The browse and admin milestones can proceed against this DB in the meantime. scripts/test-listing-roundtrip.mjs drives the whole flow end-to-end with a deterministic test key, so a sanity check is a two-command sequence: start the server with MOCK_SCAN=clean + MOCK_BNS_OWNER=<the test address>, then run the script. Negative paths (fake scan report, bad category, duplicate slug) also verified by hand.
2026-10-08 01:48:12 +02:00
`);
/* ----------------------- prepared statements ----------------------- */
const stmtInsert = db.prepare(`
INSERT INTO listings (
id, publisher, slug, name, description, category, version,
homepage, icon, download_url, download_sha256, download_size,
scan_report, signer_address, signature, signed_message, created_at
) VALUES (
@id, @publisher, @slug, @name, @description, @category, @version,
@homepage, @icon, @download_url, @download_sha256, @download_size,
@scan_report, @signer_address, @signature, @signed_message, @created_at
)
`);
const stmtGet = db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM listings WHERE id = ?`);
const stmtAllActive = db.prepare(`
SELECT * FROM listings WHERE withdrawn_at IS NULL ORDER BY created_at DESC
`);
const stmtByCategory = db.prepare(`
SELECT * FROM listings
WHERE category = ? AND withdrawn_at IS NULL
ORDER BY created_at DESC
`);
const stmtByPublisher = db.prepare(`
SELECT * FROM listings WHERE publisher = ? ORDER BY created_at DESC
`);
const stmtCountActive = db.prepare(`
SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM listings WHERE withdrawn_at IS NULL
`);
const stmtCountByCategory = db.prepare(`
SELECT category, COUNT(*) AS n FROM listings
WHERE withdrawn_at IS NULL
GROUP BY category
`);
/* ----------------------- public helpers ----------------------- */
export function insertListing(row) {
stmtInsert.run(row);
}
export function getListing(id) {
return stmtGet.get(id) || null;
}
export function allActiveListings() {
return stmtAllActive.all();
}
export function listingsByCategory(category) {
return stmtByCategory.all(category);
}
export function listingsByPublisher(publisher) {
return stmtByPublisher.all(publisher);
}
export function countActive() {
return stmtCountActive.get().n;
}
export function countByCategory() {
const rows = stmtCountByCategory.all();
const out = {};
for (const row of rows) out[row.category] = row.n;
return out;
}
prometheus: admin panel — login, listings, 3-mode toggle, audit log /admin is wallet-gated. The configured ADMIN_PUBLISHER is a BNS name; only the on-chain owner of that name can sign in. The sign-in flow is BIP-137 (same primitive publishers use): the login page shows a fresh one-shot challenge, the admin signs it in their wallet, pastes the signature, and the service verifies that it recovers to the current on-chain owner. Session is a 24-hour ed25519-signed cookie minted by the service key. Pages: /admin dashboard — totals, mode state, recent listings + audit /admin/login BIP-137 challenge sign-in /admin/listings all listings, with a Withdraw button per row /admin/modes global + per-category publish-mode toggle /admin/audit the hash-chained audit log The three publish modes exist as toggles: `append` — any valid listing goes in (launch default) `scan-first` — infected uploads are rejected before they land `review` — clean listings wait for human approval Global mode is the fallback; a per-category override takes precedence when set. The toggle persists; the review-queue enforcement lands in a later milestone (the enforcement sketch is in modes.js's header). Audit log: Every admin action (login, set_mode, clear_mode, withdraw_listing) is an append-only row with a sha256 chain over the previous row's hash. The chain does not prevent edits; it makes retroactive ones loud — row N's `prev_hash` disagreeing with row N-1's `this_hash` is the tamper signal. Withdrawal: Soft — `withdrawn_at` on the listing row. Browse hides withdrawn listings (already the case) and the detail page returns 404 for them. Nothing in the chain is undone; this is Prometheus's own view only. Session design: Cookie is `prom_admin=<payload b64url>.<signature b64url>`, signed with the ed25519 service key, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Path=/admin, 24-hour expiry. Reconfiguring ADMIN_PUBLISHER invalidates in-flight sessions by name mismatch. Challenges live in a 10-min TTL map and are tied to a specific name so one admin's challenge cannot authenticate another. Added: service/admin.js route handlers + dispatch service/admin-pages.js HTML templates for the four pages service/admin-session.js challenge + cookie mint/verify + readSession service/audit.js hash-chained append helper service/modes.js publish-mode read/write with override semantics schema: settings + audit tables scripts/test-admin-roundtrip.mjs drives the whole flow (unauth redirect → challenge scrape → sign → login → dashboard → set mode → audit inspection) with the same deterministic test key the listing-roundtrip script uses. Withdraw-flow spot-check: create a listing, log in as admin, withdraw it, confirm browse hides it and the detail page returns 404. All seven checks pass.
2026-10-08 21:35:48 +02:00
/* ----------------------- withdrawal + takedown ----------------------- */
const stmtWithdraw = db.prepare(`
UPDATE listings SET withdrawn_at = ? WHERE id = ? AND withdrawn_at IS NULL
`);
/**
* Mark a listing withdrawn. No-op if already withdrawn.
* @returns {boolean} true if a row was updated.
*/
export function withdrawListing(id, atIso) {
const info = stmtWithdraw.run(atIso, id);
return info.changes > 0;
}
const stmtAllIncludingWithdrawn = db.prepare(`
SELECT * FROM listings ORDER BY created_at DESC
`);
export function allListingsIncludingWithdrawn() {
return stmtAllIncludingWithdrawn.all();
}
/* ----------------------- settings ----------------------- */
const stmtSettingsGet = db.prepare(`SELECT value FROM settings WHERE key = ?`);
const stmtSettingsSet = db.prepare(`
INSERT INTO settings (key, value, updated_at, updated_by)
VALUES (@key, @value, @updated_at, @updated_by)
ON CONFLICT(key) DO UPDATE SET
value = excluded.value,
updated_at = excluded.updated_at,
updated_by = excluded.updated_by
`);
const stmtSettingsAll = db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM settings ORDER BY key`);
export function getSetting(key, fallback = null) {
const row = stmtSettingsGet.get(key);
return row ? row.value : fallback;
}
export function setSetting(key, value, updatedBy, atIso) {
stmtSettingsSet.run({ key, value: String(value), updated_at: atIso, updated_by: updatedBy || null });
}
export function allSettings() {
return stmtSettingsAll.all();
}
/* ----------------------- audit log ----------------------- */
const stmtAuditInsert = db.prepare(`
INSERT INTO audit (at, actor, action, target, details, prev_hash, this_hash)
VALUES (@at, @actor, @action, @target, @details, @prev_hash, @this_hash)
`);
const stmtAuditTail = db.prepare(`SELECT this_hash FROM audit ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT 1`);
const stmtAuditRecent = db.prepare(`SELECT * FROM audit ORDER BY seq DESC LIMIT ?`);
/**
* Last `this_hash`, or 64 zeros when the log is empty — the chain anchor.
*/
export function auditTailHash() {
const row = stmtAuditTail.get();
return row ? row.this_hash : '0'.repeat(64);
}
export function insertAuditRow(row) {
stmtAuditInsert.run(row);
}
export function recentAudit(limit = 50) {
return stmtAuditRecent.all(limit);
}