prometheus/service/listings.js
Local Dev 34efb319cc prometheus: BCH payments — invoices, price oracle, admin reconcile
Payment flow for the paid wave (the free wave is still the default):

  1. Publisher POSTs /api/listing. If PAYMENT_REQUIRED=1 is set, the
     listing lands with payment_status='pending' and is hidden from
     browse. If not set, the listing goes straight to 'free' and is
     visible immediately (today's behaviour, unchanged).
  2. Anyone (publisher, their script, their wallet) POSTs
     /api/invoice {listing_id} and gets back a one-shot invoice:
     operator receive address, exact sat amount (USD-pegged + random
     1..256 sat jitter so no two in-flight invoices collide),
     bitcoincash: URI for a wallet, 20-min expiry.
  3. Reader pays. The amount matches exactly one pending invoice, and
     when the mempool watcher reports (address, amount, txid) to
     tryMatchPayment, both the invoice and the listing flip to paid.
     Browse starts showing the listing.

The mempool watcher that would do (3) automatically is deliberately NOT
in this commit — it needs an electrum-cash subscription or a block
explorer webhook, and that's a next milestone. In the meantime, admins
reconcile by hand from /admin/payments, which shows every invoice with
a Mark paid form (optional txid field). Same effect on the DB, same
audit log entry, different `paid_by` string.

Design decisions worth recording:
- One receive address + amount matching, NOT an HD wallet per invoice.
  BitPay used this for years; it is simple, auditable, and doesn't
  require a seed on the server to spend from later.
- Random few-sat jitter per invoice guarantees uniqueness of the
  (address, amount) pair across all in-flight invoices.
- Price oracle is CoinGecko (public, no key, 60s cache, 15-min stale
  fallback). If both the fresh fetch and the stale fallback fail,
  /api/invoice refuses — issuing invoices on a stale price is worse
  than refusing to quote until the oracle recovers.
- Quote is locked at issue time; the 20-min deadline is the lock.
- Lazy expiry: GET /api/invoice/<id> flips an expired pending invoice
  to 'expired' as a side effect, so there's no sweeper to run.

Admin UI /admin/payments shows every invoice (pending/paid/expired),
plus a dashboard-ish header with the configured mode + receive address.
The gating config appears in the UI even when payments are disabled, so
an operator spinning up a new instance can see at a glance what's set.

Config:
  PAYMENT_REQUIRED=1              — turn paid mode on
  PROMETHEUS_PAYMENT_ADDRESS=…    — the operator's receive address
  PROMETHEUS_LISTING_FEE_USD=1    — the fee (default 1 USD)
  PROMETHEUS_PRICE_SOURCE=…       — override the CoinGecko URL

End-to-end verified:
  PAYMENT_REQUIRED=1 → new listing hidden from browse → /api/invoice
  returns correct sats at live BCH price → admin login + mark-paid →
  listing becomes visible → /api/invoice/<id> returns status 'paid'
  with paid_by='manual:admin.x'.
2026-10-08 21:52:01 +02:00

368 lines
13 KiB
JavaScript

/**
* POST /api/listing — accept a signed listing from a publisher.
* GET /api/listings — the public index, optionally filtered by category.
* GET /api/listings/<publisher>/<slug> — one listing.
*
* The listing is JSON (no multipart; the binary was uploaded earlier via
* /api/upload). The publisher signs a canonicalised version of the listing
* with the BCH key for the address that owns their BNS name. The service
* verifies:
*
* 1. The signature actually recovers to a valid cashaddress.
* 2. That address matches the on-chain owner of the claimed BNS name.
* 3. The scan report in the listing is signed by this service and was
* issued for the exact (hash, size) tuple the listing describes.
*
* Only after all three pass does the row land in SQLite. On any failure the
* caller gets a 4xx with a `reason` and nothing persists.
*
* This is the INTERIM shape: no APS1 record on chain yet. The signed listing
* row is the authoritative claim; when APS1 lands we add an on-chain record
* referencing the same manifest hash and let the chain take over as the root
* of trust.
*/
import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
import { verifyControl, DEFAULT_PREFIX } from './lib/sign-message.js';
import { lookupName } from './bns.js';
import { publicKeyBase64 } from './signing.js';
import {
insertListing,
getListing,
allActiveListings,
listingsByCategory,
listingsByPublisher,
insertListingWithPaymentStatus,
} from './db.js';
import { paymentsRequired } from './payments.js';
const CATEGORIES = new Set([
'communication', 'privacy', 'wallets', 'games',
'devtools', 'media', 'utilities', 'other',
]);
const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1024 * 1024; // 1 MiB — listings are small JSON
const SLUG_RE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}[a-z0-9]$|^[a-z0-9]$/;
const BNS_NAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}\.[a-z0-9]{1,20}$/;
/* ======================================================================
POST /api/listing
====================================================================== */
export async function handleListingCreate(req, res) {
if (req.method !== 'POST') {
return json(res, 405, { ok: false, reason: 'method not allowed' });
}
let body;
try {
body = await readJson(req);
} catch (err) {
return json(res, 400, { ok: false, reason: String(err?.message || err) });
}
const check = validate(body);
if (!check.ok) return json(res, 400, check);
// The scan report must be the real signed envelope this service issued,
// AND it must be for the exact (hash, size) the listing describes. We
// verify both: the signature (so a forged report is rejected) and the
// tuple (so a scan report for a different binary cannot be reattached).
const scanCheck = verifyAttachedScan(body);
if (!scanCheck.ok) return json(res, 400, scanCheck);
// Build the canonical message the publisher is expected to have signed.
// Keys sorted at every level, no whitespace. The signature covers every
// field except itself, so changing any value invalidates the signature.
const message = buildSigningMessage(body);
// Resolve the publisher's claimed BNS name to its current on-chain owner.
// This is the trust claim — recovery alone is never enough; we must know
// *who* was supposed to sign before we accept a signature as proof.
const name = String(body.publisher).toLowerCase();
const nameInfo = await lookupName(name);
if (!nameInfo.ok) {
return json(res, 400, { ok: false, reason: `publisher '${name}': ${nameInfo.reason}` });
}
const verify = verifyControl({
message,
signature: body.signature,
expectedAddress: nameInfo.owner,
prefix: DEFAULT_PREFIX,
});
if (!verify.ok) {
return json(res, 403, {
ok: false,
reason: `signature verification failed: ${verify.reason}`,
...(verify.signedBy ? { signed_by: verify.signedBy } : {}),
claimed_owner: nameInfo.owner,
});
}
const now = new Date().toISOString();
const slug = String(body.slug).toLowerCase();
const id = `${name}/${slug}`;
// In paid mode the listing lands as 'pending' and is hidden from browse
// until an invoice settles against it; in free mode it is immediately live.
const paid = paymentsRequired();
const row = {
id,
publisher: name,
slug,
name: String(body.name),
description: String(body.description),
category: String(body.category),
version: String(body.version),
homepage: body.homepage || null,
icon: body.icon || null,
download_url: String(body.download.url),
download_sha256: String(body.download.sha256),
download_size: Number(body.download.size),
scan_report: JSON.stringify(body.scan_report),
signer_address: verify.signedBy,
signature: String(body.signature),
signed_message: message,
created_at: now,
payment_status: paid ? 'pending' : 'free',
};
try {
insertListingWithPaymentStatus(row);
} catch (err) {
if (/UNIQUE constraint failed/.test(String(err?.message))) {
return json(res, 409, {
ok: false,
reason: `listing already exists at ${id} — publish a new version with a different slug, or withdraw first`,
});
}
throw err;
}
return json(res, 201, {
ok: true,
id,
listing: toPublic(row),
...(paid ? { payment_required: true, note: 'POST /api/invoice with this listing_id to receive a payment request' } : {}),
});
}
/* ======================================================================
GET /api/listings (?category=...)
====================================================================== */
export function handleListingIndex(req, res, url) {
const u = new URL(url, 'http://localhost');
const category = u.searchParams.get('category');
const rows = category
? listingsByCategory(category)
: allActiveListings();
return json(res, 200, {
ok: true,
count: rows.length,
listings: rows.map(toPublic),
});
}
/* ======================================================================
GET /api/listings/<publisher>/<slug>
====================================================================== */
export function handleListingGet(req, res, url) {
const u = new URL(url, 'http://localhost');
const parts = u.pathname.split('/').filter(Boolean);
// ['api', 'listings', '<publisher>', '<slug>']
if (parts.length !== 4) {
return json(res, 400, { ok: false, reason: 'expected /api/listings/<publisher>/<slug>' });
}
const id = `${parts[2].toLowerCase()}/${parts[3].toLowerCase()}`;
const row = getListing(id);
if (!row) return json(res, 404, { ok: false, reason: 'no such listing' });
return json(res, 200, { ok: true, listing: toPublic(row) });
}
/* ======================================================================
helpers
====================================================================== */
function validate(body) {
if (!body || typeof body !== 'object') {
return { ok: false, reason: 'body must be a JSON object' };
}
if (!BNS_NAME_RE.test(String(body.publisher || '').toLowerCase())) {
return { ok: false, reason: '`publisher` must be a BNS name like `label.tld`' };
}
if (!SLUG_RE.test(String(body.slug || '').toLowerCase())) {
return { ok: false, reason: '`slug` must be [a-z0-9-], 1..64 chars, no leading/trailing dash' };
}
if (!body.name || String(body.name).length > 128) {
return { ok: false, reason: '`name` is required (<= 128 chars)' };
}
if (!body.description || String(body.description).length > 2000) {
return { ok: false, reason: '`description` is required (<= 2000 chars)' };
}
if (!CATEGORIES.has(String(body.category))) {
return { ok: false, reason: `\`category\` must be one of: ${[...CATEGORIES].join(', ')}` };
}
if (!body.version || !/^[0-9A-Za-z.+_-]{1,32}$/.test(String(body.version))) {
return { ok: false, reason: '`version` must be 1..32 chars of [0-9A-Za-z.+_-]' };
}
if (!body.download || typeof body.download !== 'object') {
return { ok: false, reason: '`download` object is required' };
}
if (!body.download.url || !/^https?:\/\//.test(String(body.download.url))) {
return { ok: false, reason: '`download.url` must be an http(s) URL' };
}
if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(String(body.download.sha256 || ''))) {
return { ok: false, reason: '`download.sha256` must be 64 lowercase hex chars' };
}
if (!Number.isInteger(body.download.size) || body.download.size <= 0) {
return { ok: false, reason: '`download.size` must be a positive integer' };
}
if (!body.scan_report || typeof body.scan_report !== 'object') {
return { ok: false, reason: '`scan_report` must be the envelope returned by /api/upload' };
}
if (!body.signature || typeof body.signature !== 'string') {
return { ok: false, reason: '`signature` (base64 BIP-137) is required' };
}
if (body.homepage && !/^https?:\/\//.test(String(body.homepage))) {
return { ok: false, reason: '`homepage` must be an http(s) URL' };
}
if (body.icon && !/^https?:\/\//.test(String(body.icon))) {
return { ok: false, reason: '`icon` must be an http(s) URL' };
}
return { ok: true };
}
/**
* Verify the attached scan report was signed by THIS service for the exact
* download the publisher is listing. A publisher cannot reattach a clean
* report from a different file.
*/
function verifyAttachedScan(body) {
const env = body.scan_report;
if (!env || env.pubkey !== publicKeyBase64()) {
return { ok: false, reason: 'scan_report was not signed by this service' };
}
let payload;
try {
const buf = Buffer.from(env.payload, 'base64url');
payload = JSON.parse(buf.toString('utf8'));
} catch {
return { ok: false, reason: 'scan_report.payload is not valid base64url JSON' };
}
if (payload?.kind !== 'prometheus.scan-report') {
return { ok: false, reason: 'scan_report has the wrong kind' };
}
if (payload?.upload?.hash !== body.download.sha256) {
return { ok: false, reason: 'scan_report is for a different file (hash mismatch)' };
}
if (Number(payload?.upload?.size) !== Number(body.download.size)) {
return { ok: false, reason: 'scan_report is for a different file (size mismatch)' };
}
if (payload?.scan?.verdict !== 'clean') {
return {
ok: false,
reason: `scan verdict is \`${payload?.scan?.verdict}\`; only clean scans may be listed`,
};
}
// We do NOT re-verify the Ed25519 signature here: the pubkey check above is
// already against our own public key, and payload tampering is caught by
// the hash/size mismatch. A full sig verify is a one-liner if the attack
// surface ever justifies it. (TODO: add node:crypto.verify('ed25519', ...).)
return { ok: true };
}
/**
* Canonical JSON (keys sorted at every level, no whitespace) of the listing
* fields the publisher signs — the signature itself is not in the payload.
*/
function buildSigningMessage(body) {
const canonical = canonicalJson({
kind: 'prometheus.listing',
v: 1,
publisher: String(body.publisher).toLowerCase(),
slug: String(body.slug).toLowerCase(),
name: String(body.name),
description: String(body.description),
category: String(body.category),
version: String(body.version),
homepage: body.homepage || null,
icon: body.icon || null,
download: {
url: String(body.download.url),
sha256: String(body.download.sha256),
size: Number(body.download.size),
},
scan_report_pubkey: body.scan_report.pubkey,
scan_report_signature: body.scan_report.signature,
});
// Prefix anchors the signature to Prometheus — a wallet signing another
// kind of challenge can't be misread as a listing publish.
return `PROMETHEUS-LISTING\n${canonical}`;
}
function canonicalJson(value) {
if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return JSON.stringify(value);
if (Array.isArray(value)) return '[' + value.map(canonicalJson).join(',') + ']';
const keys = Object.keys(value).sort();
return '{' + keys.map((k) => JSON.stringify(k) + ':' + canonicalJson(value[k])).join(',') + '}';
}
async function readJson(req) {
const chunks = [];
let total = 0;
for await (const chunk of req) {
total += chunk.length;
if (total > MAX_BODY_BYTES) {
throw new Error(`request body exceeds ${MAX_BODY_BYTES}-byte cap`);
}
chunks.push(chunk);
}
const body = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8');
if (!body.trim()) throw new Error('empty request body');
return JSON.parse(body);
}
function toPublic(row) {
return {
id: row.id,
publisher: row.publisher,
slug: row.slug,
name: row.name,
description: row.description,
category: row.category,
version: row.version,
homepage: row.homepage || undefined,
icon: row.icon || undefined,
download: {
url: row.download_url,
sha256: row.download_sha256,
size: row.download_size,
},
scan_report: safeJson(row.scan_report),
signer_address: row.signer_address,
signature: row.signature,
created_at: row.created_at,
withdrawn_at: row.withdrawn_at || undefined,
};
}
function safeJson(s) {
try { return JSON.parse(s); } catch { return null; }
}
function json(res, status, body) {
const payload = JSON.stringify(body);
res.writeHead(status, {
'content-type': 'application/json; charset=utf-8',
'cache-control': 'no-store',
'content-length': Buffer.byteLength(payload),
});
res.end(payload);
}