feat(theseus/addons): signed add-on update endpoint, à la Firefox XPI
Decouples bundled-add-on updates from Theseus releases. An add-on
whose addon.json declares an updateURL can be republished at any time
without shipping a new Theseus installer; existing installs pick it up
on the next boot's +30 s background check.
Client flow (main-process only, no UI touchpoints in this commit):
initAddons()
├── promoteStagedUpdates() # promote signed stage if newer
├── seedBundledAddons() # bundle wins over on-disk if newer
└── AddonHost.discoverAndActivate()
30 s later:
└── checkAndStageUpdates() # fetch, verify, download, stage
Signature: Ed25519 over
"silentmode.addon-update-v1|<id>|<version>|<tarball-sha256>",
verified against a hardcoded set of operator pubkeys living in
addon-update-pubkeys.js. Domain-separated so the operator key can't
be tricked into signing a message with a different purpose. Empty
pubkey array is the shipping default — checkAndStageUpdates() then
short-circuits and no outbound requests are made, which is the safe
posture until the operator ceremonies a key in.
Payload: gzipped tar, extracted with the system tar (present on
Win10 1803+, macOS, Linux). Path traversal defended by tar's default
refusal of `..` entries; the extracted manifest's id + version are
re-checked against the signed values before staging.
Staged updates go to <userData>/addons-updates-staged/<id>-<version>/.
Promotion into <userData>/addons/<id>/ reuses seedBundledAddons's
backup dance: existing folder moves to
<userData>/addons-backups/<id>-<oldver>-<timestamp>/ so any local
edits survive.
New files:
- addon-updater.js — client
- addon-update-pubkeys.js — hardcoded pubkeys (empty; edit + rebuild to rotate)
- scripts/generate-update-keypair.mjs — one-time keygen
- scripts/sign-addon-update.mjs — operator packager+signer
- docs/ADDON-UPDATES.md — operator brief + threat model
Wired into main.js at boot; screenshot add-on's addon.json advertises
the reference updateURL for when the endpoint goes live.
2026-09-07 21:58:30 +02:00
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// Ed25519 public keys authorized to sign bundled-addon updates.
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//
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// A pubkey listed here can, at runtime, cause Theseus to REPLACE any user's
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// bundled add-on with a signed payload fetched over the network. Only add
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// pubkeys the Silent Mode operator controls.
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//
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// Rotation:
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// 1. Generate a new keypair with scripts/generate-update-keypair.mjs.
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// 2. Sign next updates.json entries with BOTH old and new key.
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// 3. Ship a Theseus release adding the new pubkey to this array (both live).
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// 4. After users have updated past that release, ship a follow-up release
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// removing the old pubkey; stop signing with it.
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//
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// Empty array means "no update endpoint" — the client short-circuits and
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// makes no outbound requests. This is the safe default for a fresh build.
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module.exports = {
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PUBKEYS_HEX: [
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2026-09-07 23:57:47 +02:00
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"732b1263a236b0030383a2376597cfa43c3624b3ca2912a46134f8f2a06e6012", // Silent Mode ops, generated 2026-09-07
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feat(theseus/addons): signed add-on update endpoint, à la Firefox XPI
Decouples bundled-add-on updates from Theseus releases. An add-on
whose addon.json declares an updateURL can be republished at any time
without shipping a new Theseus installer; existing installs pick it up
on the next boot's +30 s background check.
Client flow (main-process only, no UI touchpoints in this commit):
initAddons()
├── promoteStagedUpdates() # promote signed stage if newer
├── seedBundledAddons() # bundle wins over on-disk if newer
└── AddonHost.discoverAndActivate()
30 s later:
└── checkAndStageUpdates() # fetch, verify, download, stage
Signature: Ed25519 over
"silentmode.addon-update-v1|<id>|<version>|<tarball-sha256>",
verified against a hardcoded set of operator pubkeys living in
addon-update-pubkeys.js. Domain-separated so the operator key can't
be tricked into signing a message with a different purpose. Empty
pubkey array is the shipping default — checkAndStageUpdates() then
short-circuits and no outbound requests are made, which is the safe
posture until the operator ceremonies a key in.
Payload: gzipped tar, extracted with the system tar (present on
Win10 1803+, macOS, Linux). Path traversal defended by tar's default
refusal of `..` entries; the extracted manifest's id + version are
re-checked against the signed values before staging.
Staged updates go to <userData>/addons-updates-staged/<id>-<version>/.
Promotion into <userData>/addons/<id>/ reuses seedBundledAddons's
backup dance: existing folder moves to
<userData>/addons-backups/<id>-<oldver>-<timestamp>/ so any local
edits survive.
New files:
- addon-updater.js — client
- addon-update-pubkeys.js — hardcoded pubkeys (empty; edit + rebuild to rotate)
- scripts/generate-update-keypair.mjs — one-time keygen
- scripts/sign-addon-update.mjs — operator packager+signer
- docs/ADDON-UPDATES.md — operator brief + threat model
Wired into main.js at boot; screenshot add-on's addon.json advertises
the reference updateURL for when the endpoint goes live.
2026-09-07 21:58:30 +02:00
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],
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};
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