Panel + standalone window now accept all three handle forms as synonyms, and
the UI defaults to the hermes:alice scheme form. Signin is persistent across
restarts via safeStorage-sealed identity; the ⋯ menu adds Sign out.
- lib/hermes.js: parseHandle(input) → {kind, value} canonicalises any of
hermes:alice, alice.erm, alice.bch, alice@parent.tld, npub1…, or raw hex.
renderHandle(name, mode) formats a .erm name as hermes:alice (default),
alice.erm (dotted), or alice@hermes.tel (email). Non-.erm names always
render dotted so a .bch handle can't masquerade as a sub-identity.
- main.js: hermesResolveTo() unifies contacts-add + send + their panel-API
twins behind one path. Sub-identity (alice@parent.tld) resolution returns
a crisp "not available yet" until the mainnet mint of the parent name's
signed-records manifest lands — the parser accepts the form today so UI
copy and placeholders can show it.
- main.js: safeStorage-sealed identity at <userData>/hermes-identity/,
auto-restored on app ready. New _hermesAPI.signOut wipes it. init() takes
{ remember: false } for a one-shot session (default: persist). A
hermes-restored event fires on auto-restore so the panel skips the
signin screen.
- panel.html: renderHandle() mirror client-side; ⋯ menu with "Signed in as
hermes:alice" header + Sign out; placeholders show all three forms; the
signin hint tells users they stay signed in.
On-chain `.erm` and `hermes.tel` mints are deliberately deferred to mainnet
per user direction — the parser and display paths are tld-agnostic, so a
mainnet switch is one constant change in lib/hermes.js (HERMES_TLD /
HERMES_EMAIL_PARENT) plus the panel's mirror of them.
262 lines
11 KiB
JavaScript
262 lines
11 KiB
JavaScript
// Hermes: name-addressed NIP-17 messaging over Nostr.
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//
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// This module lives inside Theseus because it depends on `nostr-tools` (a
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// non-trivial dep the shared library layer, Argus, shouldn't carry). Loaded
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// from main.js via dynamic import — same pattern as password-vault.js.
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//
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// Layers, sender → wire (NIP-17 + NIP-59):
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// 1. rumor = unsigned kind:14 chat event
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// 2. seal = kind:13 signed by sender (rumor encrypted to recipient)
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// 3. wrap = kind:1059 signed by ephemeral (seal encrypted to recipient)
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//
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// Only the wrap goes on the wire; the relay sees an ephemeral pubkey, an
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// opaque ciphertext, and a #p tag — never the sender or the plaintext.
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import { webcrypto as wc } from "node:crypto";
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import {
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finalizeEvent, generateSecretKey, getPublicKey, getEventHash,
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verifyEvent, nip19, nip44,
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} from "nostr-tools";
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const enc = new TextEncoder();
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// ---- key derivation --------------------------------------------------------
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// Same shape password-vault uses: BIP-39 → 64-byte seed → 32-byte purpose root
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// via HKDF-SHA256 with `info="silentmode/<purpose>"`. Different purpose string,
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// so passwords/0 and messenger/0 are cryptographically disjoint — one leak
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// never yields the other.
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/** BIP-39 mnemonic → 64-byte seed (PBKDF2-SHA512, 2048 iters, standard). */
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export async function bip39ToSeed(mnemonic, passphrase = "") {
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const km = await wc.subtle.importKey("raw",
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enc.encode(String(mnemonic).normalize("NFKD").trim()),
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"PBKDF2", false, ["deriveBits"]);
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const salt = enc.encode(("mnemonic" + String(passphrase || "")).normalize("NFKD"));
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return new Uint8Array(await wc.subtle.deriveBits(
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{ name: "PBKDF2", salt, iterations: 2048, hash: "SHA-512" }, km, 512));
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}
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/** Seed → 32-byte purpose root via HKDF. Purpose string is public — the
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* security comes from the seed, not the info parameter. */
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export async function seedToPurposeRoot(seedBytes, purpose) {
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const key = await wc.subtle.importKey("raw", seedBytes, "HKDF", false, ["deriveBits"]);
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const info = enc.encode(`silentmode/${purpose}`);
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return new Uint8Array(await wc.subtle.deriveBits(
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{ name: "HKDF", hash: "SHA-256", salt: new Uint8Array(0), info }, key, 256));
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}
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/** BIP-39 mnemonic → { sk, pkHex, npub } — the Nostr identity for messaging.
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* Path is "messenger/0" — reserved for Hermes in
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* TheseusNavigator/ROADMAP-identity-wallet.md. */
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export async function nostrKeyFromMnemonic(mnemonic, passphrase = "") {
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const seed = await bip39ToSeed(mnemonic, passphrase);
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const sk = await seedToPurposeRoot(seed, "messenger/0");
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const pkHex = getPublicKey(sk);
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return { sk, pkHex, npub: nip19.npubEncode(pkHex) };
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}
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/** Same identity but from an already-derived messenger/0 root (32 bytes) —
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* used when the password vault already carries the root and re-entering the
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* mnemonic would be redundant. Input is Uint8Array(32) or 64-char hex. */
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export function nostrKeyFromRoot(root) {
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const sk = typeof root === "string"
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? Uint8Array.from(Buffer.from(root, "hex"))
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: root;
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if (!(sk instanceof Uint8Array) || sk.length !== 32) {
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throw new Error("nostrKeyFromRoot: expected 32-byte Uint8Array or 64-char hex");
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}
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const pkHex = getPublicKey(sk);
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return { sk, pkHex, npub: nip19.npubEncode(pkHex) };
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}
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// ---- record parsers --------------------------------------------------------
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// The BNS resolver is transparent: whatever the name owner published in `r`
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// lands as entry.records.<key>. Here we validate and normalise the two Hermes
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// record types.
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//
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// np — Nostr pubkey, hex (64) or npub1…
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// nr — comma/space-separated list of ws(s):// relay URLs
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const HEX_PUBKEY_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i;
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// ---- handle forms ----------------------------------------------------------
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// Hermes accepts three equivalent handle forms, all resolving to the same
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// BNS registration under the hood:
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//
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// hermes:alice — URI scheme, hides the TLD (default display)
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// alice.erm — dotted BNS form
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// alice@hermes.tel — email form; `hermes.tel` is a BNS name whose
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// signed-records manifest lists sub-identities
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//
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// `.erm` and `hermes.tel` are the planned on-chain names; both mint on
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// mainnet, pending user action. Until then, parseHandle still accepts all
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// three forms — resolution against the real chain just returns "not found"
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// for unminted TLDs/parents. Existing `.bch` names keep working untouched.
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export const HERMES_SCHEME = "hermes";
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export const HERMES_TLD = "erm";
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export const HERMES_EMAIL_PARENT = "hermes.tel";
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const HANDLE_LOCAL_RE = /^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,30}[a-z0-9])?$/;
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const DOTTED_NAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?(?:\.[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]*[a-z0-9])?)+$/;
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/**
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* Normalize any accepted handle form to a canonical lookup descriptor:
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* { kind: "hex", value: "<64 hex>" }
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* { kind: "npub", value: "npub1…" }
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* { kind: "name", value: "alice.erm" } — BNS name lookup
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* { kind: "sub", value: { local: "alice", parent: "hermes.tel" } }
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* — signed-records
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* sub-identity lookup
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*/
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export function parseHandle(input) {
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const s = String(input || "").trim();
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if (!s) throw new Error("empty handle");
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if (/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(s)) return { kind: "hex", value: s.toLowerCase() };
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if (s.toLowerCase().startsWith("npub1")) return { kind: "npub", value: s };
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const lower = s.toLowerCase();
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// hermes:alice — expand to the default TLD. `.erm` is the planned name,
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// but any TLD switch is a one-line change to HERMES_TLD above.
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const schemePrefix = HERMES_SCHEME + ":";
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if (lower.startsWith(schemePrefix)) {
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const local = lower.slice(schemePrefix.length).trim();
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if (!HANDLE_LOCAL_RE.test(local)) throw new Error(`bad hermes: handle: ${s.slice(0, 48)}`);
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return { kind: "name", value: `${local}.${HERMES_TLD}` };
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}
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// alice@parent.tld — email form, treated as a sub-identity under parent.
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if (lower.includes("@")) {
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const at = lower.indexOf("@");
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const local = lower.slice(0, at);
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const parent = lower.slice(at + 1);
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if (!HANDLE_LOCAL_RE.test(local) || !DOTTED_NAME_RE.test(parent)) {
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throw new Error(`bad email handle: ${s.slice(0, 48)}`);
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}
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return { kind: "sub", value: { local, parent } };
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}
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// alice.erm, alice.bch, alice.tel — dotted BNS name. Must have at least
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// one dot to disambiguate from "bare" sub-identity requests (which the
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// client enriches with the default parent before calling in).
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if (DOTTED_NAME_RE.test(lower)) {
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return { kind: "name", value: lower };
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}
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throw new Error(`unrecognised handle: ${s.slice(0, 48)}`);
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}
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/**
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* Render a canonical descriptor (or a BNS name) in the user's preferred form.
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* Modes:
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* "scheme" (default) → hermes:alice (only when the name is under HERMES_TLD)
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* "dotted" → alice.erm
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* "email" → alice@hermes.tel (only for HERMES_TLD names)
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* Non-hermes names (alice.bch, bob.sc) always render dotted — the scheme
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* and email forms are reserved for the Hermes TLD so a .bch name can't
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* accidentally look like a sub-identity.
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*/
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export function renderHandle(name, mode = "scheme") {
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const n = String(name || "").toLowerCase();
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if (!n || !n.includes(".")) return n;
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const suffix = "." + HERMES_TLD;
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if (!n.endsWith(suffix)) return n;
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const local = n.slice(0, -suffix.length);
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if (mode === "dotted") return n;
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if (mode === "email") return `${local}@${HERMES_EMAIL_PARENT}`;
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return `${HERMES_SCHEME}:${local}`;
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}
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export function parseNpRecord(raw) {
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if (typeof raw !== "string" || !raw.trim()) throw new Error("np: empty or missing");
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const v = raw.trim();
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if (HEX_PUBKEY_RE.test(v)) return v.toLowerCase();
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if (v.startsWith("npub1")) {
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const d = nip19.decode(v);
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if (d.type !== "npub" || typeof d.data !== "string" || !HEX_PUBKEY_RE.test(d.data)) {
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throw new Error("np: npub decoded to unexpected shape");
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}
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return d.data.toLowerCase();
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}
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throw new Error(`np: not hex(64) and not npub1…: ${v.slice(0, 24)}…`);
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}
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export function parseNrRecord(raw, { defaults = [] } = {}) {
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if (typeof raw !== "string" || !raw.trim()) return defaults.slice();
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const seen = new Set(); const out = [];
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for (const tok of raw.split(/[,\s]+/)) {
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const url = tok.trim();
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if (!/^wss?:\/\//i.test(url)) continue;
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if (seen.has(url)) continue;
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seen.add(url); out.push(url);
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}
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return out.length ? out : defaults.slice();
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}
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/** Extract Hermes recipient info from a resolver Entry. */
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export function parseHermesRecords(entry, { defaultRelays = [] } = {}) {
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if (!entry || !entry.records) throw new Error("no on-chain entry for name");
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return {
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npPk: parseNpRecord(entry.records.np),
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relays: parseNrRecord(entry.records.nr, { defaults: defaultRelays }),
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};
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}
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// ---- NIP-17 wrap / unwrap --------------------------------------------------
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const KIND_CHAT = 14;
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const KIND_SEAL = 13;
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const KIND_GIFT_WRAP = 1059;
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// NIP-59: randomise timestamps up to 2 days in the past so relays can't
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// correlate wrap-arrival with real send-time.
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const TWO_DAYS = 2 * 24 * 60 * 60;
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const jitteredNow = () =>
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Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - Math.floor(Math.random() * TWO_DAYS);
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const convKey = (sk, pkHex) => nip44.v2.utils.getConversationKey(sk, pkHex);
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const encrypt = (sk, pkHex, plain) => nip44.v2.encrypt(plain, convKey(sk, pkHex));
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const decrypt = (sk, pkHex, cipher) => nip44.v2.decrypt(cipher, convKey(sk, pkHex));
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/** Wrap a plaintext chat message from senderSk to recipientPkHex. */
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export function wrapChat({ senderSk, recipientPkHex, text }) {
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const senderPkHex = getPublicKey(senderSk);
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const rumor = {
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kind: KIND_CHAT,
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pubkey: senderPkHex,
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created_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
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tags: [["p", recipientPkHex]],
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content: text,
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};
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rumor.id = getEventHash(rumor);
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const seal = finalizeEvent({
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kind: KIND_SEAL,
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created_at: jitteredNow(),
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tags: [],
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content: encrypt(senderSk, recipientPkHex, JSON.stringify(rumor)),
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}, senderSk);
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const ephemeralSk = generateSecretKey();
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return finalizeEvent({
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kind: KIND_GIFT_WRAP,
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created_at: jitteredNow(),
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tags: [["p", recipientPkHex]],
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content: encrypt(ephemeralSk, recipientPkHex, JSON.stringify(seal)),
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}, ephemeralSk);
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}
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/** Unwrap a kind:1059 gift wrap for receiverSk.
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* Returns { senderPkHex, text, createdAt } or throws on tamper. */
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export function unwrapChat({ receiverSk, wrap }) {
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if (wrap.kind !== KIND_GIFT_WRAP) throw new Error(`not a gift wrap (kind ${wrap.kind})`);
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if (!verifyEvent(wrap)) throw new Error("gift wrap signature invalid");
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const seal = JSON.parse(decrypt(receiverSk, wrap.pubkey, wrap.content));
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if (seal.kind !== KIND_SEAL) throw new Error(`inner is not a seal (kind ${seal.kind})`);
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if (!verifyEvent(seal)) throw new Error("seal signature invalid");
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const rumor = JSON.parse(decrypt(receiverSk, seal.pubkey, seal.content));
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if (rumor.kind !== KIND_CHAT) throw new Error(`inner is not chat (kind ${rumor.kind})`);
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if (rumor.pubkey !== seal.pubkey) throw new Error("rumor.pubkey does not match seal.pubkey");
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return { senderPkHex: rumor.pubkey, text: rumor.content, createdAt: rumor.created_at };
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}
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