A resolver that learns about blocklists only after the first scam needs a release before it can warn anyone. The consumer ships now, pointed at a list with no entries, so the first real report costs a transaction instead. A list is an address, named by a BNS name whose bl record holds it. Entries are RPT (the report), BLK and UBK. A flag counts only when it names a valid report in the same list for the same name and reason, and only when its transaction is spent FROM the list address: anyone can pay an address, so being in its history proves nothing. That spend rule is what lets the authority change hands later without the resolver learning the difference. resolveName attaches blocked, blockReason, blockReportTxid and blockedBy to a flagged name and leaves every other answer untouched. With no subscription it is the old resolver exactly. A list that cannot be read never stops a name from resolving. Lists are read from full electrum servers: the project's beacon-only indexers answer 'no history' for any other address, which would look like an empty list. The default list is sirius-blocklist.x, a two-part name because a three-part one collapses to its parent. Address conversion is dependency-free so this file stays a single-file drop-in.
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BNS1 — a minimal Namecoin-style name protocol on Bitcoin Cash (chipnet prototype)
Names are anchored by CashTokens name certificates on the BCH chain; records travel in OP_RETURN payloads; discovery uses a beacon address so a plain electrum server is the only infrastructure a resolver needs. No fork, no sidechain.
Roles of the three mechanisms
| Mechanism | Role |
|---|---|
| CashTokens certificate (immutable NFT) | Ownership. The certificate's commitment is the UTF-8 name. Whoever holds the certificate owns the name. Consensus guarantees nobody can mint an output of an existing category without spending it. |
| OP_RETURN payload | Data. BNS1 prefix + JSON: the name's records (URL, inline HTML page, payment address). |
| Beacon dust output | Discovery. Every protocol tx pays 600 sat to the well-known beacon address, so blockchain.address.get_history(beacon) enumerates every registration/update ever made. |
Beacon (chipnet): bchtest:qp8njaa9a3ahg7259s5qajnce526n0rttsq8qwx4jl
Transactions
REG — one tx that simultaneously:
- Mints an immutable certificate, commitment = UTF-8 name (≤ 40 bytes). Its category (= token ID) becomes the name's permanent identity.
- Carries
OP_RETURN "BNS1{...json...}"with{"o":"REG","n":<name>,"r":<records>}. - Pays 600 sat to the beacon.
UPD — one tx that:
- Spends (moves) the name's certificate back to the owner — this is the ownership proof. A vout carrying the name's category is only possible if a vin held it (consensus).
- Carries
OP_RETURN "BNS1{...}"with{"o":"UPD","n":<name>,"r":<newRecords>}. - Pays 600 sat to the beacon.
REL — one tx that:
- Spends the name's certificate and does not recreate it (no output carries the category): the certificate is burned.
- Carries
OP_RETURN "BNS1{...}"with{"o":"REL","n":<name>}. - Pays 600 sat to the beacon.
The name returns to the pool. Specified in PROTOCOL-ADDENDUM-release.md.
Transferring a name = sending the certificate to a new owner (no beacon tx needed).
A certificate moved that way must be anchored by an UPD before it can be released.
Records (JSON, keep total payload ≤ 200 bytes)
u— https URL the name points to (gateway redirects)h— inline HTML: a tiny website stored fully on-chaina— cashaddr for payments (the "send to alice.bch" use case)ip— IPv4 of a server that answers for the .bch host directly (DNS answers this instead of the local gateway)p— upstream URL the local gateway reverse-proxies (address bar stays .bch)s3—bucket/key(single object) orbucket/prefix/(site root) stored on the Sia network, served by the gateway through a local s3d daemon (credentials in sia-s3.json, not on-chain). Storage is decentralized and encrypted; the retrieval door is the local daemon.tls— SHA-256 fingerprint (hex, over DER) of the name's TLS certificate. The chain replaces the CA: identity comes from the certificate holder publishing this record, encryption from ordinary TLS. Resolvers/extensions can pin it; the prototype's trust path is the BNS Local Root CA (see ca/) which signs per-name certs and is installed as a trust anchor by setup/install.ps1.
Resolver rules (indexer-enforced)
- Fetch beacon history, sort by
(height, txid); unconfirmed last. - Then reorder causally: never index a transaction before one it spends
from. Independent transactions keep the
txidtiebreak. (See "Ordering" below — this rule is load-bearing, added 2026-07-26.) REG: valid if the same tx mints a certificate whose commitment matches the name and the name is not yet taken. First valid REG wins. If the name was released (rule 5), theREGmust be in a later block than the confirmed release — the one-block gap.UPD: valid if some output of the tx carries the name's category.REL: valid if the name is registered, no output of the tx carries the name's category, and one input spends an output of an earlier beacon transaction that carries the certificate. The name leaves the index.- Names:
[a-z0-9-]{1,32}, rendered as<name>.bch.
Ordering (why rule 2 exists)
(height, txid) alone is arbitrary within a block and within the mempool, and
that breaks the most ordinary sequence in the protocol: register a name, then
immediately point it somewhere. If the UPD's txid happens to sort below its
own REG's, the UPD is evaluated against an index that does not contain the
name yet, fails rule 4, and is silently dropped — permanently, if both land in
the same block, since the ordering never changes afterwards.
Observed on chipnet 2026-07-26: REG ca243c06… for smtest-fbe8cd.p2p and its
UPD 8da2cc4a… were both unconfirmed; 8da2… sorted first, and the record
never appeared even though the update transaction was entirely valid.
The fix is a stable topological pass over the history: keep the (height, txid)
baseline, but hold back any transaction whose parents (within the beacon set)
have not been emitted yet. Cost is O(n²) over the beacon history, which is read
once per index build. Implemented identically in src/lib/resolver-web.js and
src/lib/bns.js — the two must stay in lockstep, since a disagreement
between them is a consensus split between clients.
Blocklist (resolver-side)
Not a chain rule. A resolver may subscribe to lists of flagged names and warn
about, or refuse, a name a list flags; the name stays registered and any
resolver that does not subscribe resolves it as before. The messages (RPT,
BLK, UBK), the authority rule and the client behaviour are in
PROTOCOL-ADDENDUM-blocklist.md.
Honest limitations (prototype vs production)
- Uniqueness is indexer policy, not consensus. Production: a covenant-run registry (CashScript) that consensus-enforces one certificate per name, or full BCMR-style client-side validation of the genesis chain.
- Intra-block ordering uses txid as tiebreak among independent transactions (electrum history has no tx index). Dependent transactions are ordered causally — see "Ordering" above.
- The beacon is a keyed address (prototype convenience); production would use a keyless constant script so no one can be pressured over it.
- No expiry/renewal: names live until their owner releases them (
REL); an abandoned name still lives forever (Namecoin used ~8-month renewals to garbage-collect dead names — the covenant registry is that step). - Front-running: a miner/mempool observer could see a REG and race it
(Namecoin's two-step
name_newcommit-reveal solved this; omitted here).