Running the fork against a live WordPress found a real hole in registration, and it is the kind that only shows up when you actually try it. ECDSA public-key recovery always succeeds. Given any well-formed signature and any digest it returns a key — just not the signer's, unless the digest is the one that was signed. The auth flow leaned on that as if a wrong message would fail. It does not; it quietly yields a stranger's address. At sign-in this was harmless, because the wrong address matches no account and the attempt fails. Registration and wallet-linking were another matter: both took the recovered address and bound it to an account, so a signature over slightly different text — a challenge copied without its blank line, a wallet that rewrote the text, a login signature replayed at the registration form — created an account keyed to an address nobody could sign for. The person would see "success" and discover the truth the next time they tried to get in. Wallet-linking was worse still: it would move an existing account onto a dead address and lock its owner out of their own site. Both paths now require the address the signer claims and compare it to the recovered one, which is what verification actually means. Sign-in accepts the claim when the page sends it and uses it to turn "no account uses that wallet" into the more useful "that signature is not over the text we asked for". Also from running it: URL rewriting mangled every link on a site whose URL carries a port. The protocol-relative pass matched inside absolute URLs and gave each one a second scheme, and matching the host without its port left the port stranded as `//host:8760:8760/`. Local and staging installs would have exported a site of broken links. Plain permalinks silently collapse an entire site onto one exported file, because every post's URL is `/?p=N` and its path is `/`. The queue looks healthy the whole time. The Publishing screen now says so. Translations loaded on `plugins_loaded`, which WordPress 6.7 warns about on every request — the kind of noise that trains people to stop reading logs. And one deletion: an `is_email()` filter written on the assumption that WordPress rejects `.invalid` addresses. It does not — `is_email()` validates syntax, not whether a domain could exist — so the filter never fired. A filter that appears to relax a rule but does not is worse than no filter, because someone later reasons from it. The documentation made the same claim and has been corrected. Verification added rather than asserted: tests/live.mjs drives a real instance over HTTP (40 checks), and tests/mock-gateway.mjs answers uploads with the signature check transcribed from the gateway's own source, so the publishing path can be exercised without a registered name.
5.3 KiB
Testing
Four suites, in rough order of how fast they run and how much they prove.
tests/run.sh # unit + interop, ~1 second, no services
node tests/live.mjs # end to end against a running instance
The fast suites
tests/run.sh
Needs PHP 7.4+ with GMP or BCMath, and Node 18+. About a second, no database and no server.
| Suite | Checks | What it pins |
|---|---|---|
test-crypto.php |
23 | secp256k1 against published vectors, RFC 6979 determinism, low-S, recovery round trips |
test-identity.php |
44 | CashAddress encode/decode/normalise, BIP-39/32 derivation, both signing envelopes, canonical JSON |
test-export.php |
49 | URL-to-path mapping, document-relative rewriting, gateway path rules |
interop.mjs |
22 | the browser wallet against the PHP one, byte for byte |
interop.mjs is the one that matters most. Sirius Press implements the
same cryptography twice — PHP verifies, JavaScript signs — and every vector in
that file came from libauth, the library the Sirius portal wallet and the BNS
gateway both use. If the two implementations disagree by a byte, nobody can
log in, and the error looks like a rejected password rather than a hash
mismatch. This suite makes that a test failure instead of a bad evening.
A throwaway instance
You do not need Docker, MySQL or a VPS to run a real Sirius Press. PHP's built-in server plus the official SQLite drop-in is enough, and it starts in seconds.
# 1. a patched tree
tools/build.sh
cp -R dist/sirius-press /tmp/wpsite
# 2. SQLite instead of MySQL
curl -fsSL -o /tmp/sqlite.zip \
https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/sqlite-database-integration.zip
unzip -q /tmp/sqlite.zip -d /tmp/wpsite/wp-content/plugins/
cp /tmp/wpsite/wp-content/plugins/sqlite-database-integration/db.copy \
/tmp/wpsite/wp-content/db.php
mkdir -p /tmp/wpsite/wp-content/database
# 3. a config (any salts will do for a throwaway)
cp /tmp/wpsite/wp-config-sample.php /tmp/wpsite/wp-config.php
# edit it: DB_* values are ignored by the SQLite drop-in, but add
# define( 'WP_HOME', 'http://127.0.0.1:8760' );
# define( 'WP_SITEURL', 'http://127.0.0.1:8760' );
# 4. run it
php -S 127.0.0.1:8760 -t /tmp/wpsite
Then open http://127.0.0.1:8760/wp-admin/install.php. The setup screen asks
for a wallet address instead of an email one — that alone confirms the core
patch applied.
PHP needs pdo_sqlite, sqlite3, gd, mbstring and one of GMP or BCMath.
Set pretty permalinks before testing publishing. With plain permalinks
every post's URL is /?p=N, whose path is /, so the whole site maps to
index.html and each page overwrites the last. The Publishing screen refuses
to let this pass quietly, but a script driving the queue directly will not see
the warning.
End to end
WALLET=/tmp/admin-wallet.json BASE=http://127.0.0.1:8760 node tests/live.mjs
WALLET is a JSON file holding an administrator's phrase and address:
{ "phrase": "twelve words …", "address": "bchtest:qq…" }
40 checks covering sign-in, replay refusal, a stranger's signature, a signature over altered text, purpose separation, registration, the recovery page and the REST endpoints — against a real WordPress, with real sessions.
It creates one account per run, so point it at a throwaway.
Running it with the ecosystem loaded
The suite is worth far more with third-party plugins active, because it then also proves the fork's admin screens survive them:
for p in wordpress-seo contact-form-7 woocommerce; do
curl -fsSL -o "/tmp/$p.zip" "https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/$p.zip"
unzip -q -o "/tmp/$p.zip" -d /tmp/wpsite/wp-content/plugins/
done
# activate them, then re-run tests/live.mjs
If you hit a 429, the rate limiter is doing its job — it caps signature verification per client. Clear it between runs:
DELETE FROM wp_options WHERE option_name LIKE '%_transient_%sirius_rl_%';
Publishing, without a registered name
The upload path cannot be tested end to end without a BCNR name and the key that owns it. What can be tested is the part that actually breaks — the bytes being signed — against the real verifier:
node tests/mock-gateway.mjs --owner bchtest:qq… --port 8799
This implements PUT /api/site/<name>/<path> with the signature check
transcribed from Argus/src/gateway/public-gateway.mjs: same envelope, same
digest, same recovery, same comparison against the owner. A request it accepts
is one the real gateway accepts.
Point the site at it — Sirius Press → Settings, gateway
http://127.0.0.1:8799 — store the matching phrase, publish a post, and watch
the queue drain. Signing with any other key gets the same 403 the real gateway
returns.
It needs @bitauth/libauth resolvable from the script, which is the point: it
verifies with the same library the gateway does, not with ours.
What is not covered
- A fresh VPS install.
install.shand the Docker stack are written and syntax-checked but have not been run against a clean Ubuntu box. - A real gateway upload. Verified against the transcribed verifier above,
not against
navigate.stwith a registered name. - Browser UI. The signing scripts are exercised through Node, which runs the same code, but nobody has clicked the buttons in a browser.