The PIN could only be six digits and was set from three bare inputs; the
unlock prompt sat at the top of the page; and the password manager only
filled when you found the key chip, never offered to save, and "Clear
cookies on quit" signed you out of every site, including the ones whose
login the vault already holds.
- PINs are 6 to 8 digits. The PIN record stores its length so pads draw the
right number of dots and submit on the last digit; a PIN of the wrong
length is refused without a strike, so an older Aegis pad cannot burn the
count against an 8-digit PIN.
- Settings sets a PIN in steps: master password, choose the PIN on a pad
(6/7/8), repeat it, done. The locked vault opens Theseus's own prompt,
which is now centred, with the PIN pad or the master password field.
- After a sign-in or sign-up form is sent and the page moves on, Theseus
offers to save (or update) the login, with an optional "ask for my PIN or
password before filling it". Focusing a login form offers the saved
logins under it; on a locked vault it offers to unlock first. A failed
login (the password field still showing) gets no offer.
- "Keep sign-ins for sites in your vault" (on): the quit clear spares the
cookies and site storage of sites with a saved login. Their hostnames are
kept sealed with the OS keystore so the list is readable at quit while
the vault is locked. Verified end to end on a scratch profile: signed in,
restarted, still signed in; another site's cookie was cleared.
Theseus and Aegis each wrapped the same master password under their
own PIN: two offline targets, two guess budgets, and two PINs to keep
in step. The vault PIN is now the only one. Built-in add-ons get
api.vault.pin {status, unlock, set, clear} (advertised by
features.vaultPin); unlock(pin) opens the vault in main and answers
only { ok } or why not, so the master password stays in main.
The policy is the one Aegis's PIN screens describe: five wrong PINs
lock the PIN for 15 minutes, every further wrong one locks it again,
and the master password always works. The unlock prompt uses the same
PIN pad and the same wording as Aegis, and Settings says so.
Theseus's own quick-unlock PIN had the same limit as Aegis's: once the
DPAPI seal is opened (as the user, or from a disk image plus the
Windows password) the 6-digit PIN falls to an offline search. The PIN
is now also the authorization value of a Platform Crypto Provider TPM
key whose secret is mixed into the wrapping key, so the chip's lockout
bounds guessing; lib/tpm-pin.cjs is the same module Aegis uses.
set() now refuses when there is no real OS keystore (Linux basic_text
included) instead of writing the blob in the clear, an unsealed record
from an older build is deleted, and Settings says what the PIN actually
protects against on this machine.
The vault re-locks on every restart and only the master password opened
it, so every extension that needs it (Aegis, now Pithos) either asked for
the master password itself or grew its own PIN. Theseus now owns one:
- Settings > Passwords sets, changes or removes a 6-digit PIN. The PIN
wraps the master password (PBKDF2-SHA256, 600k iterations, AES-256-GCM)
and the result is sealed with the OS keystore (safeStorage: DPAPI /
Keychain / libsecret), so a copied vault-pin.json cannot be brute-forced
elsewhere. Every unlock still ends at the master password.
- Three wrong PINs in a row require the master password. The strike count
lives in the same file, so a restart does not reset it; a successful
master-password unlock does. A PIN whose password no longer opens the
vault (password changed) is dropped.
- unlock.html is Theseus's own prompt, over the whole window: PIN pad, or
the master password. Extensions call api.vault.requestUnlock({ reason })
(vault-derive capability) and get { ok } back; what the user typed never
reaches them. Settings' locked screen offers "Unlock with PIN" through
the same prompt.
An add-on's storage.get read and parsed its whole store file on every call,
and storage.set read, parsed and rewrote it — synchronously, on the main
thread. Traced on a real profile (installed 0.3.70): with a 7.5 MB Aegis
store, 30 of the first 35 s of main-thread time went to storage.get, the
window sat in "Not Responding" from 3 s to 19 s, and the first page showed at
19 s. One get cost ~73 ms; Aegis does dozens per state update.
lib/addon-store.cjs keeps one in-memory copy per store, shared by the
add-on's api.storage (addons-host.js) and its pages (addon-storage-* IPC in
main.js). After a one-time load a get costs microseconds; values are copied
in and out (structuredClone), so callers keep the old semantics. Writes are
coalesced (100 ms) and land as temp-file + rename, and are flushed on quit;
a store that doesn't parse is moved aside instead of being replaced by {}.
Measured on copies of the same profile, dev build:
first page 16.9-17.6 s -> 1.5-1.7 s; main thread blocked 24.7-25.8 s of
30 -> 1.0-1.1 s; longest freeze 13.7-15.0 s -> 0.6 s.
The Aegis side (capping its unbounded txCache) ships separately through
Aegis's own update channel. The boot tracer gains total/longest block columns.
A preload belongs to the WebContents, not the page: a website loaded into
the Settings tab kept window.cfg and could read every vault password, flip
settings and install extensions without consent. Settings and add-on tabs
now never load web content, and the channels behind settings-preload check
their sender. `navigate` no longer accepts calls from web pages.
Add-on updates trusted any publisherSig, whatever name it carried, even for
bundled add-ons. The trust root is now the installed addon.json (publisher,
or the operator key when there is none); versions must be plain dotted
numbers; a community install can't take over a bundled or foreign id.
Also:
- autofill matches and fills against the live URL, not a stale prov.host
- bns:// forwards the raw request path (..%2F escaped the name's bucket)
- clipboard-read denied, openExternal asks; forged collision choices ignored
- web pages can't window.open file:/chrome:/theseus:; data:/blob: no longer
go to the search engine; the quick-links panel loses home-preload
- clear-history-on-quit is awaited and removes history.json too
- update helper takes its paths from the environment (non-ASCII profiles)
- electrum poll has a deadline; misses wait at most 2.5 s
- p records go through Tor; add-on proxy credentials are actually used
- whole-folder require-cache bust on add-on version change; failed
activate() no longer leaks its request filter
- approvals released when the window closes; web-app ids stay on-origin
Anyone who owns a BCDN name can now publish a Theseus extension, and every
Theseus can install it with the publisher's signature verified locally.
Gateway (Argus/src/gateway/public-gateway.mjs):
PUT /api/ext/<name>/<id>/<version> takes the gzipped tar, checks two BCH
message signatures against the name's current NFT owner (one authorises
the upload, one is stored in the channel), inspects the package
(addon.json at the root, id/version/main match, 8 MB cap), enforces
first-publisher ownership of an id and monotonic versions, and writes the
tarball, the extension's updates.json and community/catalog.json to Sia.
GET /api/ext/catalog reads the catalog back with CORS.
Theseus:
lib/publisher-sig.mjs recovers the signer of a channel entry; main.js
compares it with the publisher name's owner from Theseus's own chain
index before installing or updating, so neither the relay nor a tampered
catalog can pass off code under a trusted name. addon-updater.js gains
installCommunity() and accepts publisher-signed entries in the regular
update check (operator Ed25519 entries unchanged). Settings › Extensions
shows the community catalog with Install / Update; Settings › Plug-ins
links to theseus.x/plug-ins.
theseus.x:
/plug-ins/ is a separate page for the first-party plug-ins (Aegis,
Ariadne's Thread) with live versions and hashes; /extensions/ lists the
bundled extensions, the community catalog, and how to build and publish;
/extensions/publish/ signs and uploads a package in the browser with the
wallet that holds the publisher's name (session helper + wallet bundle
copied alongside).
A 0.3.44 → 0.3.45 auto-update on 2026-09-11 left the install without
app.asar and ffmpeg.dll ("ffmpeg.dll not found" at launch). The setup was
hash-verified; the old-version uninstaller had moved the whole old install
into its temp folder when both NSIS processes died ~8 s after the spawn,
and the install step never wrote a file. The killer was not identified, so
every overlap with the app's own lifetime is removed instead:
- install-update-now no longer spawns the setup; it records the path and
quits. will-quit writes <userData>\update-helper.cmd and starts it as a
detached cmd.exe (verified to outlive the app; not a child of ours).
- The helper waits for our PID to be gone (child powershell Wait-Process),
gives Chromium's children a grace period, runs the setup directly, and
runs it once more if resources\app.asar is missing afterwards — the
installer is idempotent, so a second pass repairs a torn install. The
helper deletes itself.
- Zone.Identifier is stripped from the verified download so nothing that
starts it through the shell raises a mark-of-the-web prompt.
Console-less cmd.exe traps discovered and designed around (see the module):
child console programs' redirected stdout is empty (no tasklist|find
probing), `start /wait` on a .cmd hangs, a detached powershell.exe
started straight from Node does nothing, `timeout` needs a console.
Scenario tests: setup starts only after the process exits, once with
app.asar present, twice without, helper gone afterwards.
- password-vault: createVault takes { messengerRootHex } opt; unlockVault
surfaces messengerRoot (null on legacy vaults, so nothing regresses);
saveVault persists it; bindMessengerRoot mutates an unlocked state for a
later attach-mnemonic-to-existing-vault flow.
- main.js password-setup: when the user provides a mnemonic, ALSO compute
seedToPurposeRoot(seed, "messenger/0") and store it. Random-seed vaults
stay as-is (no mnemonic = no messenger root to store).
- main.js hermes-init: two modes now — { mnemonic } (unchanged) or
{ useVault: true } (uses vaultState.messengerRoot directly, no mnemonic).
Response includes source: "vault" | "mnemonic" for the panel to badge.
- main.js hermes-can-use-vault: cheap availability probe used by the panel
to decide whether to show the vault sign-in shortcut.
- hermes.js: nostrKeyFromRoot(root) accepts 32-byte Uint8Array or 64-char
hex; produces the same {sk, pkHex, npub} as nostrKeyFromMnemonic for the
same seed (unit-verified: derivation paths converge on f2c92519...67f4).
- Messages panel: "Sign in with password vault" button appears above the
mnemonic entry iff the vault is unlocked AND was set up from a mnemonic.
The mnemonic path stays as the always-available fallback — bind is
genuinely optional, not required.
- Hermes/proof/: standalone keystone — BIP-39→Nostr, NIP-17 wrap/unwrap,
name-addressed send/receive verified end-to-end via public relay
- Argus/src/lib/hermes-derive.js: HKDF(silentmode/messenger/0) using libauth
so the registrar can compute np without pulling nostr-tools into Argus
- Argus/src/register-hermes-chipnet.mjs: idempotent REG/UPD script; publishes
np (Nostr pubkey) and nr (relay) records for a chipnet name
- TheseusNavigator/lib/hermes.js: same derivation + wrap/unwrap + record
parsing, canonical for Theseus; guarded by lib/package.json type:module
- TheseusNavigator/messages.html + messages-preload.js: Messages panel UI
(identity from mnemonic, live inbox, compose by .bch name), .bch suffix
stripped from displayed names
- TheseusNavigator/main.js: HERMES_MOD + loadHermesLib next to VAULT_MOD;
ipc handlers (hermes-status/init/close/inbox/send/open), per-relay
subscription with auto-reconnect, status pushed on WS open/close,
reverse-resolve pk -> .bch name via cached BNS index, Ctrl+Shift+M shortcut
via web-contents-created (works from any tab)
- Chipnet hermes.bch registered with np=f2c92519...67f4 nr=wss://nos.lol
(txid 7fc6de4544c13b782f163fdb892ea6749785886d05a336282fa659d722c7e92b);
end-to-end verified in Theseus
