Import accepts a picture of a QR code. The file is decoded in the panel by
the vendored jsQR, drawn to a canvas: no upload, no network, no camera.
Image, not camera, on purpose. Theseus sets blockCamera + hideMediaDevices
by default and hides device labels from fingerprinting; a camera scanner
would fail silently for everyone until they turned that off globally, and a
wallet should not be the reason a privacy browser gives up the camera. A
photo or screenshot of the code needs no permission at all.
What comes back is classified, never trusted. A QR is opaque to the person
holding it, and "scan this to restore your wallet" is a working phish, so
the decode only chooses which field to fill:
BIP39-shaped (12/15/18/21/24 lowercase words) -> mnemonic field
WIF or 32-byte hex -> private key field
anything else -> nothing is filled; the
decoded text is shown so
the user can see it was a
URL, an address, or junk
Nothing auto-submits. The user reads what landed in the box and presses
Import, and the host handler still does the real validation.
jsQR 1.4.0 is vendored at lib/jsqr.js under Apache-2.0 with its LICENSE
beside it, unmodified and unminified — code that touches seed phrases should
be auditable in the shipped add-on, not an opaque blob. It is 57 KB gzipped.
Verified by round-tripping through the shipped path: Aegis's own encoder
builds the QR, it is rasterised to a real PNG File, and decodeQrFile() reads
it back byte-exact; an image with no code returns null rather than throwing;
and driving the actual file input fills the mnemonic for a seed, fills the
key field for a WIF, and leaves every field untouched for a phishing URL.
